Climate Security in Central Europe (Addressing the Challenges of Climate, Defence and Security Nexus)

Institute for Central Europe has completed a report on climate security in Central Europe, which was part of several months of work on a project funded by NATO Public Diplomacy Division Programmes. The purpose of this report is to raise awareness on the issue of climate security in general and within the Central European and Slovak contexts in particular. A special focus is on exploring the role of NATO in climate security. Enjoy 🙂

Executive Summary

The purpose of this report (funded by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division Programmes) is to raise awareness on the issue of climate security in general and within the Central European and Slovak contexts in particular. A special focus is on exploring the role of NATO in climate security. Ultimately, a main goal is to inform a more active approach to addressing climate change in Central Europe, with a focus on tangible results.
Climate change is a security problem, with both direct and indirect security impacts. Direct impacts include droughts, wildfires, floods, and extreme environmental events like heatwaves and cold snaps. Indirect impacts include migration, opportunistic crime, ethnic tensions, government instability, and social unrest. Climate change also poses operational and strategic challenges to armed forces around the world, degrading the operational capabilities of the world’s militaries, all while increasing the demand for their use.
NATO recognizes climate change as a key challenge of the current era. In recent years, the Alliance has produced several declarations and documents to address climate security. NATO has both the capacity and the will to take on a leadership role in climate security; it is one of the crucial response organizations to climate-related disasters and regional destabilization due to climate change impacts. However, NATO is currently weaker in its existing implementation of climate adaption and mitigation measures, particularly in procurement terms. Sustaining a growing number of deployments in increasingly adverse conditions will tax member states’ logistics capabilities to their limits. For the immediate future, the investment in early warning systems and assessment of the changing risks is crucial. It is also imperative for NATO to work with academia, industry, member states, and other partners. Sharing with Allies methodologies and data for assessing vulnerability would encourage NATO members to pay equal attention to climate security issues.
As a NATO member, Slovakia can benefit by being an active participant in climate security discussions both at home and within the Alliance. Climate change affects Slovakia in both direct and indirect ways, including extreme environmental events, prolonged droughts (and related energy security issues due to nuclear power development), floods, food insecurity, and migration. As a member of NATO, Slovakia will likely also have to manage, in partnership with its partners, climate security crises beyond its borders – in form of peace operations and humanitarian relief work, for example. Slovakia’s security is also affected by climate change impacts on its critical allies (like the USA). Climate change may weaken critical partner militaries and leave Slovakia more vulnerable as crucial NATO forces could be decreased or drawn down by disaster relief commitments at home. Changing threat profile will likely make some security and miliary planning obsolete and necessitate a more general and flexible approach to security than is currently used in Slovakia and within NATO.
The Slovak government has produced several policy documents and guidelines to both tackle environmental degradation and increase its preparedness for climate change. The Ministry of Defence in particular has several climate-related initiatives and produced strategic documents and action plans as well as best practices. Yet, there is currently no legislative requirement to reduce GHG emissions from the military vehicles and a more significant application of green initiatives on the Slovak Armed Forces is lacking. A key issue for the near future is the readiness of the armed forces to face the risks of climate change, both from an operational and strategic perspective.
One of the fundamental issues for climate security will be the greening of national militaries. The key general challenges of green transition are operational uncertainty and financing. Another challenge will be identifying viable green technologies with military applications. Overcoming this challenge will require development of ‘green’ defense equipment of performance that is superior to fossil fuel-powered alternatives. It is thus crucial to include in discussions experienced defence, scientific, and engineering experts.
There is some synthesis between green technology trends and military technology that may offer a path to greening of NATO militaries, including Slovakia’s. Both private and public Slovak defence companies have engaged with green technologies and, where available, take advantage of incentives designed to increase efficiency and decrease energy consumption. Motivations are mixed, but undeniably increased energy costs serve as incentive to cost-cutting and increasing production efficiency.
Given the outlined challenges and opportunities, recommendations in this report are both general and pertain specifically to the greening of armed forces and defence industry. In general, due to the complexity of climate change impacts, including cascading effects and compound disasters, there is a need for strategic foresight tailored to states’ (and the region’s) specific needs. Further potential solutions to the challenges of climate security in both Central Europe and Slovakia include a private-public cooperation, a better communication of the costs of climate change, increased state capability to respond to major disasters, and focus on common context and frameworks. For NATO and its members, it is crucial to invest in new technologies, allocate some defence spending to research & development, provide political incentives to large defence companies, and bring start-ups into climate security discussions.
Within the context of armed forces and defence industry, Slovakia should consider the potential changes in military logistics in current and future procurement projects. Rethinking the equipment lifecycle model offers emission reduction potential and synergizes with cost-saving and Slovak defence export plans. Keeping Slovak defence industries operational should be a government priority. There is also a need for effective signaling of greening intent on the subject of green defence procurement. This may, among other things, drive innovation in Slovak defence industries for green technologies, as there would be a clear signal of potential profits for businesses that do so.
NATO standardization on green technologies in defence would likely yield positive results in a relatively short timeframe. At the same time, NATO standards need to be accompanied by some degree of subsidization. Generally, lack of funding is the driving force behind slow modernization. NATO should therefore work towards subsidization or incentives for green standardization if it is serious about its members’ militaries transitioning into being greener. If NATO subsidization is unfeasible, partnerships with members or institutions capable of offering subsidies for green military technology may be a viable alternative.
Slovakia will likely substantially benefit from being a NATO member due to the guaranteed response it will receive from capable partners if it suffers from severe climate change impacts. However, resilience building for the upcoming crises is crucial. Slovakia should be prepared for a highly insecure future, one not only shaped by overt Great Power competition, but also by acute and chronic crises that are in some way created, shaped, or aggravated by climate change.

1. Introduction

The international defence community has long recognized climate change as a major security concern. Aside from impacts on human societies, including food, water, and physical security, climate change poses operational and strategic challenges to armed forces around the world. In light of the worsening global climate trends and projections, NATO member states and their armed forces will need to adapt their tactics and inventories to better face the upcoming challenges of climate change.
NATO has made visible efforts in the area of climate security, including the 2021 Climate Change and Security Agenda, and Climate Change and Security Action Plan, among others. The topic of climate security has remained a priority for the Alliance, one that is only likely to grow in salience. The efforts that NATO has made – and potentially will make – in this area have implications for the member states, including Slovakia.
While climate change is of concern among the Slovak population,1 its security dimensions are not well- known among the Slovak general public. Climate change remains viewed as a largely environmental issue, with less attention paid to its social, political, economic, and security dimensions.
The purpose of this report is to raise awareness on the issue of climate security in general and within the Central European and Slovak contexts in particular. A special focus is on exploring the role of NATO in climate security, including its current and future planned activities in this area. The report highlights some areas of preparedness, challenges, and opportunities for both Slovakia and NATO in addressing climate security, as well as possible ways of increasing climate considerations in Slovak defence procurement and long-term military planning, within the context of its membership in NATO. Ultimately, a main goal is to inform a more active approach to addressing climate change in Central Europe, with a focus on tangible results. Landlocked Central Europe has as much at stake from climate change as the more obviously affected coastal states of its NATO partners.
This report, funded by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division Programmes, is the outcome of several months of research, interviews with experts, and a public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe (ICE). The report synthesizes the perspectives of officials from both NATO and the Slovak Ministry of Defence as well as scholars and representatives of the civil society, the Slovak defence industry, and the Slovak Armed Forces.
The report consists of four main parts. The first part discusses the concepts of environmental and climate security, including general direct and indirect impacts of climate change on both security and defence. The second part provides information on NATO’s activities (and challenges) in climate security, while the third part examines climate security in Slovakia. This includes a discussion of likely impacts of climate change in the Slovak context and Slovakia’s preparedness, challenges, and opportunities in climate security, including the greening of its armed forces and its defence industry. The last part provides conclusions and recommendations for relevant stakeholders.

2. Concepts: Background and Definitions

Security, in general, is about protecting human societies from danger. The traditional view of security focuses on protecting states, primarily in military terms.2 Another, a more recent view of security focuses on human life and dignity as a referent object (i.e., that which must be protected from danger).3 However, any part of human society can be politically elevated as needing protection from danger – that is, any part can be “securitized.” With climate change posing an increasing global challenge, the environment and environmental risks have been brought to the forefront of public security discussions. This section introduces the basic tenets of environmental security and positions them in the debate on the security dimensions of climate change.

2. 1. Environmental security

Environmental security is about “securitizing the environment,” meaning assigning a level of political urgency to some environmental problems that are of particular concern. There are two general views of environmental security. First, the environment threatens human societies, including national or human security (e.g., due to various natural hazards). Second, human societies harm the environment, for example through industrial development or resource extraction.4 Some complex environmental security issues, however, encompass both of these views.
In the 1990s, environmental security was mainly tied to concerns over resource scarcity and associated violent conflict in developing countries.5 Environmental scarcity could mean depletion of fish stocks, water shortage, or degradation of soil, among other things. Environmental degradation as a potential security threat for the state influenced states’ foreign policy at the time. At the core was the concern that changes in resource access would threaten international stability and even lead to military conflict in some parts of the world. The idea was that the least developed countries would have a difficult time adapting to changes in resource access because they could not easily adapt to environmental degradation. Environmental scarcity was viewed as a cause of social unrest that could potentially spill over to violent conflict.
The link between the resource scarcity and violence has, however, been disputed by many. For example, critics have called for focusing attention away from environmental scarcity and more towards improving democracy and economic development as well as cooperative responses to environmental problems.6 Yet, overpopulation and resource depletion, pollution, and nature conservation concerns dominated early views of environmental security. Currently, the overwhelming focus is on climate change.

2. 2. Climate security

The Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that “human-induced climate change, including more frequent and intense extreme events, has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people, beyond natural climate variability.”7 The report further warns that climate change has caused some “irreversible impacts as natural and human systems are pushed beyond their ability to adapt.”8 Ecosystems and built environment have been affected by the growing severity of climate and weather extremes. Millions of people across the world have suffered from food insecurity, water shortages, and exposure to extreme environmental events. Climate change and security are therefore inextricably linked.
For a long time, however, climate change used to be considered a development not a security issue. The UN Security Council put climate change on the agenda for the first time in 2007, citing concerns about border disputes (due to changing landscape from the melting icesheets and rising sea levels), increased migration, and conflicts linked to scarcity, poverty, and extreme weather events.9 Two years later, the UN General Assembly also acknowledged climate change impacts on security, emphasizing the importance of the Framework Convention on Climate Change. The focus was much more on the human security aspects of climate change than on the military (i.e., conflict) dimension.10
In the US security circles, too, some security dimensions of climate change became more apparent in the mid-2000s.11 In 2007, the CNA Corporation (an American non-profit research and analysis organization)
published a national security report warning of the multi-dimensional impacts of climate change.12 The
report was produced by a US military advisory group that consisted of more than a dozen retired three and four-star generals and admirals. The group was led by former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Sherri Goodman. These senior military officials were concerned about climate change impacts on the US security – specifically, the worsening of existing security risks as environmental conditions deteriorate. In other words, to them, climate change was a “threat multiplier.”
The idea of climate change as a threat multiplier is now well established. Recently, in a return to the environmental security debates of the 1990s, climate change has been linked to concerns over the conflict potential of resource scarcity and environmental degradation in general. These concerns, too, have their critics,13 and some analysts direct attention back to the issues of democracy and effective governance. For example, there is an interrelationship between climate mitigation and corruption. Corruption can lead to distortions in mitigation strategies, response, and recovery spending as resources (including foreign aid) are siphoned off for personal gain.14 Socio-political impacts of climate change, including also migration and greater refugee movements, tend to be indirect or induced. Other, more direct security concerns include increasingly unhabitable land due to droughts or inundation, disasters, and diseases.

2. 2. 1 . Direct security impacts of climate change

The direct impacts of climate change differ across the globe. Coastal and low-lying island states are most at risk from the rising sea levels, and their citizens are becoming environmental refugees, having to leave their countries. Landlocked states in temperate zones may see the impacts of climate change as a more remote threat and with that, the urgency to act now is also smaller. Regardless, some direct impacts have been felt globally to a larger or smaller extent.15
More frequent and intense droughts is one consequence of global warming with implications mainly for food and water security. Droughts and reduced rainfall decrease crop yields and land productivity, and especially in parts of the world that already suffer from food shortages (i.e., tropical and warm climates). Some of these parts are also affected by desertification – irreversible degradation of land in the desert zones of Africa, Asia, North America, Australia, and South America. Security impacts include food scarcity (due to land degradation) and water shortages leading to malnutrition and use of polluted water sources, decline in biodiversity (with food security impacts as hunting becomes more difficult), and more exposure to natural hazards like landslides and dust storms. Degraded soil also contributes to deforestation and thus removal of carbon sinks, worsening climate change.
Draughts create favourable conditions for wildfires. An increased incidence of wildfires is a consequence of rising temperatures, which in turn increase the likelihood of fires in drier forested areas. Security impacts of wildfires include harm to human lives, health (e.g., poor air quality), property, and environment that people rely on. More frequent and more severe fires are increasingly occurring in previously more temperate environments. For example, the 2022 wildfires in Slovenia were linked to a persistent draught and heatwaves that set temperature records across Europe.16 Climate change also increases the length of the fire weather season.17
Other direct security impacts of climate change are linked to flooding, both coastal and inland. Sea level rise poses security problems for coastal communities – not simply due to the rising water but also because of the subsequent soil erosion, and deterioration in soil and freshwater quality due to saltwater intrusion. Climate change also changes and disrupts the natural water cycle. As the glaciers melt, rivers may flood more frequently and more intensely in inland regions. Collapsing buildings and trees jeopardize human life and property. Flooded areas are also prone to water-borne diseases, with impacts on human health.
Extreme events linked to changes in temperature and atmospheric pressure include cyclones, tornadoes, sandstorms, and extreme temperatures (cold snaps and heatwaves). Cyclones (hurricanes in North America or typhoons in East Asia) lead to coastal flooding as well as wind damage and loss of human lives. Climate change increases the frequency and intensity of windstorms, some of which will start affecting regions that were previously sheltered. For example, the 2020 Storm Ciara brought widespread damage to Western Europe and then moved inland, causing fatalities as far as Slovenia.18 Similar unexpected impacts may be linked to tsunamis. While tsunamis (i.e., giant sea waves) are generally a consequence of seismic activity, in the future some tsunamis may be caused by climate change in areas where glacier melt causes massive landslides into the sea.19 Impacts would include rapid coastal flooding and associated loss of human life and property damage.
Tornadoes originate inland rather than on the sea, and their security impacts include damage from high winds and property damage and human life loss due to moving of large objects and explosions. The 2021 tornado that ran through several villages in the South Moravia region of Czechia was one of the deadliest extreme weather events in Europe that year.20
Cold snaps harm human health through exposure (e.g., hypothermia) but also cause deaths due to hazardous conditions created by snow and ice (e.g., building collapse, infrastructure made unsafe). Heatwaves are problematic especially for the youngest and oldest members of human societies who are more vulnerable (children are less able to regulate their body temperatures and seniors often have pre- existing health conditions). The two deadliest heatwaves on record occurred in 2003 in Europe and 2010 in Russia – together they claimed about 50,000 lives.21 The 2022 heatwave also affected European energy security as the Norwegian hydropower reservoirs dwindled and the French struggled to cool their nuclear reactors due to warmed rivers. The low level of Europe’s largest rivers hindered transportation, including transport of coal.22
Lastly, climate change has direct impacts on human health due to diseases that spread from tropical regions to northern, traditionally more temperate zones as those begin to warm up. Insects like mosquitos that are disease vectors are able to breed in these newly warmer climates. For example, the West Nile virus has been reaching norther and norther zones in the USA since the late 1990s.23
Climate change does not affect all countries equally and within states some groups have been and will be hit harder than others. Aside from low-lying territories (threatened by the sea level rise) and the Arctic (threatened by the melting sea ice), those most affected are the young, the old, and the poor. Younger and older people suffer more health problems from heatwaves or from diseases. Poor people are more exposed to extreme weather due to the often inadequate and underdeveloped locations in which they live. These people are also most affected by scarcity and thus tend to suffer from food and water insecurity. Many are forced to leave their homes, feeding into migration waves with potential new security impacts in countries that may be far away from climate hot zones.

2. 2. 2. Indirect security impacts of climate change

Many of the above-noted direct effects of climate change cascade throughout societies and create or exacerbate other problems. Migration has been perhaps the most frequently cited indirect impact of climate change. Desertification, for example, is an important driver of migration waves (e.g., Mexicans and Haitians migrating to the USA).24 Migrants tend to settle in crowded locations, which contributes to urbanization and the growth of slums. This creates health hazards for these communities but also exacerbates more traditional security problems, including social tensions. Water scarcity in particular has been linked to migration and further opportunistic crime, ethnic tensions, and terrorism.25 A growing frustration with governments that are unwilling or unable to address impacts of climate change may feed into the growth of extremist ideologies and mobilization of extremist movements.26
Food insecurity, too, may lead to social tensions especially when economic and political institutions fail to manage the distribution of scarce resources and disruptions to the food supply occur at a larger scale. Global food markets are shaped by the global demand and supply for food. Extreme weather changes or events may significantly disrupt and limit the global food supply, which then influences food prices. The result of food insecurity would be an almost inevitable aggravation of existing grievances, with potential social unrest. As referenced earlier, this would affect poorer states much more than wealthier ones as poorer states lack the resources to seek alternative food sources, may have contractual obligations to supply domestic agricultural products to the international market, and lack robust and capable institutions and organizations to manage the situation.
Climate change will also affect supply chains for a variety of goods and services in addition to food. Critical primary resources such as metals and minerals are often located in the areas affected by environmental degradation and climate change, including flooding and desertification. Reduced access to such resources may make climate mitigation efforts more difficult as rare earth minerals (like cobalt) are necessary for the latest generation of batteries.

2. 3. Military and the environment

The environment has been part of regular warfare for centuries. As military technologies and weapons advanced, environmental degradation as a consequence of warfare worsened. Frequently, the environment has been used as a weapon in war. Examples include burning vegetation, chemical defoliation (such as during the war in Vietnam), degradation of soil (for example, with salt), and tampering with fresh water supplies. The scorched earth tactic, which destroys crops and livestock, has been used by armies since at least the Roman times. There is also indirect environmental damage from warfare – this is mostly a side effect of the use of weapons, targeting industrial infrastructure, battlefield destruction of land, or through pollution caused by military equipment.
At peacetime the global defence community has been much criticized for environmental pollution and damage. Among militaries’ biggest sins towards the environment are nuclear weapons testing (caused for example landslides along with radioactive pollution), mass military exercises (caused excessive sewage, waste, general pollution), military base proliferation, as well as a large contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions.27 World’s militaries have been however also increasingly affected by environmental degradation and especially climate change.
While the public and the media tend to focus on the conflict potential of climate change, for armed forces there are also other concerns that are both operational and strategic. Operationally, military adaptation to climate change is crucial since much of the current equipment (e.g., sonars, helicopters) does not function properly in warmer climates. Military bases around the world are vulnerable to the sea level rise and desertification. Climate change will also open new theaters (e.g., in the extreme cold of the Arctic) and will make existing conditions in warmer climates even more challenging. In the end, climate change will degrade the operational capabilities of the world’s militaries, all while increasing the demand for their use. There is thus a need for long-term planning in investment that incorporates climate considerations and a methodology for assessing the vulnerability of military bases, personnel, and operations.28
In terms of strategic risks for armed forces, the key missions of the armies are changing with the growing requests for post-disaster humanitarian assistance and emergency relief. Many national armies are lacking sufficient equipment and training for such missions. One short-term solution is more cooperation with the civil society, including organizations like the Red Cross.29 Another strategic risk is the potential internal destabilization of countries due to effects of climate change, with cascading regional impacts. For example, regions that depend heavily on agriculture but suffer from environmental degradation are more susceptible to both internal and external migration, with potential clashes between the local groups and the newcomers. Potential tensions around land and food supply cannot be overlooked as these also provide opportunities for extremist recruitment and growth of extremist ideologies as the legitimacy of many states weakens. A remedy may be addressing the cause rather than mere symptoms of instability30 – for example, addressing the root causes of land degradation and incorporating such objectives into defence and security doctrines, including those of the NATO member states.

3. NATO and Climate Security

NATO recognizes climate change as a key challenge of the current era; it sees climate change as “one of the defining challenges of our times” and as “a threat multiplier that impacts Allied security.”31 The security implications of climate change are evident both within the territories of NATO member states (e.g., the Arctic) and in the Alliance’s neighborhood like the Sahel, Middle East, and North Africa. Both climate adaptation and mitigation efforts have been proposed or are underway since the fulfillment of NATO’s core tasks and missions depends in part on the Alliance’s responses to climate change.
Environmental security is not a new topic for NATO. At least in terms of science and technology, the Alliance has paid attention to environmental security issues since the 1960s. In mid-2000s the language of energy and environmental security began appearing in various summit declarations, most recently at the 2021 Brussels Summit and 2022 Madrid Summit.32 Climate security is a priority even among other challenges for NATO such as the ongoing war in Ukraine.33 Climate security also features on the NATO 2030 agenda34 where NATO leaders expressed the ambition for the Alliance to become the leading international organization on climate security. Expressed commitments include reduction of GHG emissions from military activities and facilities as well as plans to increase awareness and data sharing. An important goal is to adapt to changing conditions like the rising sea levels and extreme environmental events, including extreme heat and cold.35 According to a high-level NATO representative, it is imperative for NATO to work with academia, industry, member states, and other partners.36
Translating the ambition to action, NATO has produced the 2021 NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan to increase awareness, adapt, contribute to mitigation, and enhance outreach with partner countries and organizations.37 For example, within the awareness ‘pillar’ NATO’s Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment38 examines impacts on assets, installations, missions, and operations. Within the adaptation pillar, NATO plans to tackle green procurement as well as training and exercises within the context of climate change. Important here is capability development and investment in science and technology. Within the mitigation pillar NATO aims at GHG emission reduction by the NATO enterprise (i.e., NATO managed and owned assets and installations) – by at least 45% by 2030.39
NATO is currently weaker in its existing implementation of climate adaption and mitigation measures, particularly in procurement terms. Of course, there are technological challenges to decarbonization of national militaries and even to measuring of the militaries’ emissions.40 Military vehicles, for example, have strict operational requirements (e.g., harsh conditions, rapid situational changes) and energy security requirements that are difficult to meet by technologies developed for the civilian use.41 The Alliance also seems to be unable to agree on green technology standardization and emission reduction targets.42 This is likely due to the reticence of some member states to consider this issue at the NATO level. While the Alliance cannot issue legally binding regulations, setting standards has been a powerful tool to guide common procurement practices across NATO.
NATO has both the capacity and the will to take on a leadership role in climate security; it is one of the crucial response organizations to climate-related disasters and regional destabilization due to climate change impacts. This is something that the Alliance has recognized for some time in its public statements, and increasingly in its planning. To varying degrees, militaries across the Alliance are prepared to engage in humanitarian rescue and disaster relief. Sufficient and suitable equipment is however crucial. For example, there are different operating requirements of helicopters in warmer climates, which creates a need for engine improvements. Similar changes are needed with respect to operations in marine environments (since engines overheat faster in warmer ocean). Operational considerations are therefore at the centre of NATO’s climate security concerns.
NATO is no stranger to operating in extreme environments. The twenty-year operation in Afghanistan gave most members substantial experience operating in hot, freezing, muddy, and especially dusty environments. Alliance members observed the toll this took on soldiers and equipment as soldiers frequently suffered heatstroke and took time to become acclimatized, reducing freshly deployed troops effectiveness.43 Meanwhile, the lifespans of sophisticated and high-expense equipment like helicopters and armored vehicles were reduced as dust, heat, poor roads, and generally adverse conditions degraded their engines and subsystems.44 With climate change predicated to change weather patterns and worsen desertification, flooding, forest fires, and generally alter operational conditions for militaries, NATO must be prepared to operate in environments more challenging and hazardous than Afghanistan. The subsequent degradation of equipment and personnel will increase military operation costs, decrease the lifespan/increase the maintenance needs of military equipment, and exhaust the soldiers.
Sustaining a growing number of deployments in increasingly adverse conditions will also tax member states’ logistics capabilities to their limits. Good logistics are the lifeblood of any military deployment. This includes the provision of food, fuel, water, and general supplies for the military. The impact of climate change on logistics would manifest in several ways. First, logistics demands for certain operations will likely increase as water scarcity becomes common. This will increase financial costs, operational environmental impact, emissions, and vulnerability of deployed forces as logistics routes are notoriously frequent targets (for example in Ukraine and Afghanistan, the latter of which required the bribing of Taliban fighters to curtail).45
Second, logistics will likely be challenged by the variety of progressively harsh operating environments. These impacts will again be somewhat similar to those experienced in Afghanistan (or in the Arctic) by NATO forces. The difference would be in the increased number of operations and the diversity of environments in which NATO may be operating simultaneously. Not only will this increase logistics demands, but it will also consume large quantities of logistics vehicles, necessitating the production of new vehicles and spare parts with associated emissions and environmental impacts.
From interviews, official documents, and the public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe, it is evident that NATO officials understand the future challenges of climate change; they believe that sharing with Allies methodologies and data for assessing vulnerability would encourage NATO members to pay equal attention to climate security issues. NATO’s strengths in climate security are leading by example, setting standards, advising, and providing a forum for discussing best practices.46 For the immediate future, the investment in early warning systems and assessment of the changing risks is crucial. It is also imperative for NATO to work with academia, industry, member states, and other partners, and to keep investing in both the military and climate to ensure regional and global security. As a NATO member, Slovakia can benefit by being an active participant in climate security discussions both at home and within the Alliance.

4. Climate Security in Slovakia

4. 1. Security impacts of climate change

Slovakia is a landlocked country with a temperate climate. Due to its location in the mid-latitudes, Slovakia has thus far seen comparatively mild manifestations of climate change. Perhaps the most obvious general impacts are an increased frequency of extreme environmental events and specifically floods and droughts. As a result of climate change, the annual flooding in Slovakia has varied across regions, with mountain areas affected by floods the most.47 Droughts affect both drinking water sources and agricultural productivity. Furthermore, more frequent and longer heatwaves threaten the health of the Slovak population, especially the aging groups. The summer of 2022 was the hottest on record in Slovakia and prolonged droughts are expected for the future.48
Droughts also have energy security implications for Slovakia. Even though the country makes relatively little use of hydroelectric power, its nuclear power facilities at Jaslovske Bohunice and Mochovce require significant volumes of water for cooling. The heatwave of summer 2022 led to many nuclear reactors across Europe facing challenging operational conditions as water levels in rivers dropped to their lowest points in decades.49 As Slovakia is increasingly betting on nuclear power for its future energy needs and as economic opportunity (a new reactor opened at the end of 2022 in Mochovce), future prolonged droughts jeopardize economic, energy, and water security.
In Slovakia, some of the most pressing impacts of climate change are indirect and include issues of food security and migration. Prolonged droughts or more intense flooding has serious security implications linked to food security, the rising prices of food stuffs and potential social unrest (as well as socio-economic issues like unemployment). According to the 2022 Global Food Security Index, Slovakia is vulnerable to climate change-induced food insecurity, largely due to insufficient protection of fresh water sources and exposure to both droughts and floods.50 The country trails behind most of the EU members in its overall food security score but performs worst in food availability, and sustainability and adaptation. The latter category is important with respect to climate change, since it reflects how well a country can respond to climate risks and disasters.
In terms of migration, while historically Slovakia has not been a target destination for migrants, the number of migrants settling in the country is slowly rising. Reasons behind legal migration to Slovakia are predominantly socio-economic and include family, work, and study.51 Many migrants, however, transit through Slovakia as they travel to Western destinations. Migrants have different reasons for leaving their home countries. While the most frequent driver behind migration waves is violent conflict at home, many people are also increasingly moving for economic and environmental reasons.52
For Central European states, migration is a controversial political topic. Often underappreciated by non- Central and Eastern European (CEE) states is that the impacts of migration differ for CEE states due to their high ethnic homogeneity. Challenging such ethnic homogeneity would create political and social challenges that may be exploited by extremist movements to undermine political stability. Climate change could create a situation where Slovakia faces a choice of trying to integrate large numbers of climate refugees into a small and cohesive society or fortifying its borders. In light of these possible dilemmas for the region, Slovakia may be required to engage in increased foreign deployments with NATO as part of European-demanded initiatives to stabilize its periphery and reduce illegal migration into the European Union.

4. 1. 1. Climate change impacts on armed forces

As a member of NATO, Slovakia will likely have to manage, in partnership with its Allies, climate security crises beyond its borders. Climate change will most dramatically affect areas that already face numerous other security challenges such as Africa and the Middle East. Climate security-related interventions across North Africa are perhaps only a matter of time as European states become increasingly concerned about mass migration originating in the region. Such inter ventions might take several forms, from an increased number of small- or large-scale peacekeeping/stability operations, like those attempted by France in North Africa, to disaster relief operations for both allies and partner states alike, and interventions designed to re-establish order in rapidly failing states such as those being considered for Haiti. Beyond peacekeeping and conflict intervention, there are likely to be a variety of humanitarian crises caused by extreme weather events worldwide that might necessitate Slovak soldiers deployed in a humanitarian role with NATO, the United Nations, or other international coalitions.
Similar challenges are likely to arise closer to home. Slovakia’s new Blackhawk helicopters had their international deployment debut not in combat but in disaster response. During the height of the 2022 Czech forest fires, Slovakia lent the support of helicopters for firefighting.53 In the future, military equipment is likely to be much more needed (to be modified) for disaster response than military intervention – in the Slovak domestic context, for emergency relief during floods, for example. For most states, militaries are the only organizations that have the manpower and equipment to adequately respond to large-scale disasters both nationally and internationally. As much as NGOs and other civil organizations have some role in disaster response, national militaries have control over the largest number of physically fit young men, helicopters, logistics equipment, and long-term supplies.
Slovakia’s security is also affected by climate impacts on its critical Allies, many of whom are more immediately threatened by climate change due to the location of military bases in coastal areas. For example, the USA’s inventory of 5th generation air superiority aircraft, the F-22 Raptor, were put at substantial risk by Hurricane Michael in 2018.54 The total number of aircraft in at risk locations during this weather event was larger than Slovakia’s entire aircraft inventory. Climate change may thus weaken critical partner militaries and leave Slovakia more vulnerable as crucial NATO forces could be decreased or drawn down by disaster relief commitments at home. This may necessitate Slovakia to invest in a larger military, expending a greater share of GDP on its security to maintain territorial integrity, assert sovereignty, and deter aggression. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia has now re-emphasized the critical necessity of competent armed forces for deterring aggression and resisting land grabs by neighbours that do not respect the international order and the UN Charter. Slovakia must thus plan for an increasingly uncertain future with existential threats simultaneously posed by hostile neighbours and an increasingly hostile climate.
Climate change will distort the current threat profile and predicted threat horizon for Slovakia and its partners. How the threat profile will change is somewhat difficult to predict, beyond a general understanding that new theaters of operation, extreme weather hazards, and environmental conditions will emerge. This level of uncertainty will likely make some security and miliary planning obsolete and necessitate a more general and flexible approach to security than is currently used in Slovakia and within NATO. This could allow NATO members to be more prepared for a variety of climate change-induced and non-climate change hazards such as pandemics.55 Already the value of such an approach would have been demonstrated, had it been adopted earlier, in the managing of the COVID-19 pandemic.

4. 2. Current preparedness

The Slovak government has produced a series of policy documents and guidelines to both tackle environmental degradation (and thus ensure environmental protection) and increase its preparedness for climate change impacts. At the national level, Slovakia has conformed to the EU requirements, developing strategies and documents to set goals and set up regular reporting. These include, for example, the National Energy and Climate Plan,56 Envirostrategy 2030, 57 and the Strategy of the Environmental Policy of the Slovak Republic until 2030,58 among others. Climate change is also explicitly discussed in key Slovak security strategic documents, including the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic.59
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) in particular has several climate-related initiatives and produced strategic documents and action plans as well as best practices. MOD is aware that climate change is a security – and not simply ecological – problem. In 2020, for example, the Ministry adopted a strategic document that envisions a cleaner and more ecological defence department. Among other things, the Ministry aims to initiate interdepartmental discussions to contribute to reductions of ecological impact that the departmental activities have on the environment – this includes both the Ministry and the Slovak Armed Forces.60 Target areas include energy consumption, energy efficiency, and green procurement, among other things. Interviews conducted by the Institute for Central Europe revealed that MOD representatives also actively participate in working groups, conferences, and seminars at the EU and NATO level to discuss climate security issues.
Most activities aimed at climate mitigation or adaptation are at the civilian part of the Ministry. There are efforts to engage relevant stakeholders in dialogue on green defence, including the impacts of climate change on defence and vice versa. There are also other objectives, including greener working environment, ecological defence, and green procurement (e.g., energy saving computers, low emission vehicles, low energy buildings). MOD seeks inspiration from other countries such as the USA and Scandinavian states. The Department designs and works with various toolboxes such as a toolbox for green defence61 that puts emphasis on mobility (e.g., electric, hybrid vehicles), logistics (e.g., 3-D printing, supply by drones), and infrastructure (e.g., low-energy buildings, local energy production, virtual training). MOD also supports several research & development projects related to green technologies.
MOD’s action plan on green mobility envisions a reduction in GHG emissions produced by the civilian motor vehicle fleet by 55% by 2030 compared to 2021.62 There is currently no legislative requirement to reduce GHG emissions from the military vehicles and a more significant application of green initiatives on the Slovak Armed Forces is lacking. Reasons include lack of awareness of the problem or of suitable solutions;63 although, the Ministry plans to work on addressing these issues through the use of various toolkits and awareness programs. A key issue for the near future is the readiness of the armed forces to face the risks of climate change, both from an operational and strategic perspective.64

4. 3. Challenges and opportunities

In the international context, climate change may yield some circumstances that, if properly managed through international cooperation (e.g., NATO), might yield opportunities for Slovakia. New Arctic shipping routes, for example, may allow Slovak goods to reach destinations in Asia more swiftly, with a corresponding flow of goods and resources in the opposite direction. However, such opportunities will also create new security challenges, including possibly Slovak military commitments in the Arctic as part of NATO missions.
In the domestic context, according to interviewed experts, among the Slovak government agencies cooperation on climate security issues is much needed and can at times be challenging. Concurrently, effective communication with the public is also a challenge – what is needed is awareness raising, active communication, and active listening both within the Slovak public service, and between government agencies and the public. There is also lack of modelling for the Slovak context specifically and no conceptual framework that would account for specific climate security and defence challenges for Slovakia.
Public-private cooperation in facing the challenges of climate security presents itself as an important prospect. There are opportunities for some Slovak companies to contribute to energy security – for example, through exploring geothermal energy possibilities like advanced plasma-based technology by a Slovak start-up.65
One of the fundamental issues for climate security will be the greening of national militaries. The key general challenges of green transition are operational uncertainty and financing. Within the NATO context, green transition, however, is only feasible once the new technologies are sufficiently tested, standardized, and approved by other NATO member states to ensure interoperability as well as combat and logistical capabilities. This requires long-term planning, investment, and active discussions within the Alliance. Green defence technologies are costly, and their modification and adaptation to the needs and requirements of the armed forces increases the total investment costs even more (including the maintenance costs). With respect to the Slovak army, and CEE militaries generally, investments in green technology are a tertiary concern behind more immediately relevant funding requirements that can increase military performance such as new armored vehicles, air defence systems, and combat aircraft. Abandoning, delaying, or even modifying acquisitions to release funds for green investment is likely perceived as an unreasonable prospect for the Slovak Armed Forces, and possibly the Slovak populace at the time that a neighboring state is enduring an invasion.
Another challenge will be identifying viable green technologies with military applications. To avoid accusations of greenwashing (i.e., advocating for technologies of dubious viability and application for either emission reduction or defense) it is crucial to include in discussions experienced defence, scientific, and engineering experts. For example, there are ongoing discussions about the efficiency and applicability of some alternative fuel sources. Biofuels and synthetic fuels, however, are inefficient to produce (the latter due to high energy demands). Biofuels in particular are problematic as their production requires a lot of arable land and water, which potentially creates further environmental crises.
Biofuel production also increases deforestation and displaces production of other commodities (like food) to a new converted land. However, some types of biofuel, like switchgrass ethanol, have shown a promising potential for significantly lowering GHG emissions in transportation.66 Relevant expert opinions on this topic are therefore crucial to inform any future policies on adoption of biofuels in military greening.
In fact, general discussions on military greening would benefit from inputs from engineers and other relevant experts. Decades of research and refinement have made hydrocarbon-powered engines generally safe for military purposes. However, there is no such guarantee with alternate fuels and electric engines. Both civil and defense companies are keen to demonstrate the viability of their alternatively powered vehicles and aircraft. However, few ask if there would be an increase in vulnerability or a decrease in performance as a result.
While there has been effort to highlight prototypes that are hybrid or electrically powered, many militaries – including Slovakia’s – continue to rely on fossil fuel-powered alternatives and have chosen them over hybrid powered alternatives in recent procurement projects. An example is Slovakia’s likely upcoming acquisition of the 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), which is not the hybrid or electrical version. In choosing this version of the vehicle, Slovakia would be following the example of all other JLTV operators, including the USA, none of whom have expressed interest in the hybrid or electrical engine version.67 Overcoming this challenge will require development of ‘green’ defense equipment of performance that is superior to fossil fuel-powered alternatives. For the JLTV specifically, the manufacturer is attempting to now highlight operational advantages of the design, stating that the electrical engine version is silent, thus being suitable for more covert usage.68 However, until green defence equipment can prove itself superior to fossil fuel powered alternatives, it will likely remain confined to an exhibition of novelties.
Fortunately, there is some synthesis between green technology trends and military technology that may offer a path to greening of NATO militaries, including Slovakia’s. Perhaps the most important of these is an increasing demand in military vehicles for large on-board electrical generation or storage capacity to operate increasingly sophisticated suites of sensors, software, and processing power. Likely future trends like the deployment of direct energy weapons, electromagnetically powered weapons, and edge computing will only increase this demand. To maximize efficiency and so increase the operational capability, militaries will likely become convinced of the merits of electrically powered vehicles.

4. 4. The greening of the defence industry

While Slovakia may have thus far experienced limited greening of its Armed Forces, the domestic defence industry presents a more optimistic picture. Both private and public Slovak defence companies have engaged with green technologies and, where available, take advantage of incentives designed to increase efficiency and decrease energy consumption. Motivations are mixed, but undeniably increased energy costs serve as incentive to cost-cutting and increasing production efficiency as much as possible.
Interviews with representatives of the Slovak defence industry have revealed that across Slovak private and public defence producers, old energy-inefficient equipment is being replaced, energy saving measures are being put in place, and on-site energy generation is being utilized to reduce costs. This is hardly surprising given that energy costs for production for some Slovak defence companies have risen ten times between 2021 and 2022, while heating bills increased by over five times.69 The interviewed Slovak defence industry representatives believe that this is an unsustainable trend, with one interviewee noting that companies will either be forced to go green or go bankrupt.
Subsidies and various incentives are mostly offered by the European Union, and not by NATO or the Slovak government. These EU incentives appear to be successful. One senior public defence company representative has noted that EU funding had allowed for the installation of photovoltaic panels that are now supplying 100% of the electricity used in company offices and 20% of the electricity utilized at their production site.
The increasing concerns over climate change and emissions from the side of potential international customers and suppliers have also driven some Slovak defence companies to pursue a policy that puts a greater emphasis on emission reduction and mitigation strategies. This has reportedly extended to deep supply chain analysis of carbon emissions of suppliers and a desire to work with companies whose values similarly align. Representatives from industries that have engaged in these practices stated that they believe that shaping company values to put greater emphasis on climate change helped align the company with the values of the youngest generation of its employees. This is to help with retention of young talent, increase buy-in from new employees, and foster a more inclusive working environment.
While Slovak defence companies are taking the initiative to reduce energy consumption, leading private sector defence industry representatives believe that the government must offer incentives or risk that production moves from Slovakia (and Europe in general) to other parts of the world where labour and production costs are cheaper, and environmental and emission standards are weaker. It is thus in Slovakia’s interest from an economic and climate security perspective to offer financial and practical incentives for the adoption of cost-saving, green technologies for Slovak defence companies (and likely Slovak industry in general).

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Scholars and experts invited to participate in the interviews and public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe within this NATO-funded project have raised concerns about preparedness and future needs in climate security of Central Europe. Among the main regional security concerns are the weaponization of narratives that use migration and nationalism, and the general ability of adversaries to strategically use climate change to undermine democratic institutions. For Central Europe, climate change is not a distant phenomenon; it will affect energy security and infrastructure, among many other things. This concluding chapter outlines some general recommendations that have come out of this project, and then focuses attention on the specific recommendations pertaining to armed forces and defense industry.

5. 1. General conclusions and recommendations

Climate change is not a single variable – it is not simply about rising temperatures but affects all environmental systems with impacts cascading through these systems in at times unpredictable ways. In the future, disaster response, for example, may thus become far more complicated, expensive, and generally difficult to implement. Due to the complexity of climate change impacts, including cascading effects and compound disasters, it is imperative that adaptation and resilience building depart from doing things solely as they were done in the past. In other words, there is a need for strategic foresight tailored to states’ (and the region’s) specific needs.
As discussed by experts participating in this project, potential solutions to the challenges of climate security in both Central Europe and Slovakia include a private-public cooperation and a better communication of the costs of climate change, both human and financial. It is also crucial to increase state capability to respond to major disasters and its ability to house (and provide services to) migrants. Since national lens may be unfeasible in the Central European context with sharp divergences in energy and other policies, focusing on common context, common frameworks, and common ways of looking at the problem and solutions may be more productive. Both for NATO and its members, it is crucial to invest in new technologies, allocate some defence spending to research & development, provide political incentives to large defence companies, and bring start-ups into climate security discussions. Other, more specific recommendations, pertain to the greening of armed forces, as discussed below.

5. 2. Recommendations pertaining to armed forces and defence industry

Climate change will dramatically affect military logistics. It is likely that not only will military logistic demands increase, but they will also change. To maintain and even increase the levels of logistics efficiency, Slovakia should consider these potential changes in military logistics in current and future procurement projects. This is especially true for any vehicle purchases which, even if presently ordered with engines designed for hydrocarbons, should be capable of being upgraded with new electrically powered engines. This is important within the context of NATO and Slovakia’s partners. At some point, the USA will likely transition to operating vehicles with electric or alternatively powered engines. Having a vehicle fleet capable of similar upgrades would simplify the logistics of Slovak operations with US forces and increase the potential capabilities of the USA on Slovak territory, due to established logistic chains for electricity/alternative fuels. This recommendation however recognizes that it is impractical, cost-prohibitive, and perhaps overly idealistic to advocate for Slovakia to transition to an alternatively/electrically powered vehicle fleet until critical NATO partners do. Slovakia almost certainly cannot afford to conduct a military green transition alone in financial or technological terms.
Yet, in Slovakia, rethinking and redefining the procurement process and the lifecycle of military equipment would likely yield immediate tangible results on emission production and lifecycle carbon production for military hardware. Presently, NATO militaries generally do not emphasize recycling and reuse of equipment; instead, they focus on disposal. For example, the UK uses the CADMID cycle, which is a typical equipment lifecycle model for a NATO military.70 CADMID stands for concept, assessment, demonstration, manufacture, in service, and disposal; it describes the lifecycle of a given piece of military hardware. This model has been effective at determining equipment lifecycles in the UK, but it does not account for greener alternatives to disposal. Disposal includes many options like re- selling (as surplus) and scrapping. Putting further emphasis on re-using, recycling, and refurbishing could avoid emissions from producing new pieces of equipment. For example, rather than scrapped, equipment could be refurbished and updated, and subsequently reused or sold. This would also increase procurement efficiency as some production costs would be offset. For Slovakia, refurbishment is practically relevant as the country seeks to replace Czechoslovak legacy equipment with modern NATO standard pieces. Old equipment may be recycled for materials or sold to third party states. Slovak industries are already adept at updating and overhauling legacy hardware, so this concept offers financial incentives, too. Thus, rethinking the equipment lifecycle model not only offers emission reduction potential but also synergizes with cost-saving and Slovak defence export plans.
As noted in section 4.4 of this report, Slovakia needs to pay more attention to military green procurement. Keeping Slovak defence industries operational should be a government priority from a variety of standpoints. From a climate security perspective, it is better to protect and support local industries that are increasingly leading the way in efficient and low-emission production. Such local industries do not necessitate imports of equipment from outside Slovakia to meet defence equipment needs. Additionally, Slovak defence industries allow Slovakia to operate a larger military with reduced maintenance costs and increased repair capabilities. This is imperative from a security and emission reduction standpoint since increasing the lifespan of military equipment is one of the key mitigation strategies to reduce militaries’ carbon emissions.
With the exception of the European Union, there is currently lack of effective signaling of greening intent from either the Slovak government or NATO on the subject of green defence procurement. Effective signaling can have a major impact. For example, earlier in 2022 the UK government mandated Procurement Policy Note 06/21 (PPN 06/21),71 which is a requirement for any company looking to engage with UK tenders to have a carbon emission reduction plan, with a clear outline of how it might achieve a net zero emissions in the next ten years. Therefore, the UK government not only demanded that potential business partners meet certain standards, but also signaled that it takes emission reductions seriously and will continue to do so in the future. With PPN 06/21 disqualifying suppliers that do not have emission reduction plans, there is a clear short-term incentive for industrial greening, as well as the long-term implication that climate change-related policies will likely go further. This has reportedly pushed firms wishing to do business with the UK to proactively engage in green initiatives that go beyond PPN 06/21 as they anticipated future UK government demands and expect that they will receive a competitive edge by having greener credentials than competitors.72 Setting similar standards and requirements in Slovakia may generate similar positive effects. Furthermore, Slovakia would be contributing to making carbon emission reduction plans an international best practice for government procurement. A trickle-down effect may also be observable in driving innovation in Slovak defence industries for green technologies, as there would be a clear signal of potential profits for businesses that do so.
While, as discussed earlier, NATO has developed environmental and emission-related best practices, its standards related to procurement and logistics to advance climate security have been lagging behind. Fuel, ammunition, and many other defence assets are standardized across NATO due to member-directed standardization. For example, 5.56x45mm ammunition is the standard intermediate rifle caliber ammunition, because NATO members agreed upon it in 1980.73 For the most part these standards contribute substantially to guiding members to pursue suitable procurement strategies as NATO effectiveness is greatly improved by the resulting interoperability. From a defence industry perspective, NATO standards also present very strong signaling that specific technologies will be in high demand. This is because NATO militaries are a primary customer for most European and North American defence companies. NATO standards also typically become international standards as the world’s militaries seek the highest quality equipment and align their procurement with likely defence partners. Standardization on green technologies in defence would likely yield positive results in a relatively short timeframe.
At the same time, NATO standards need to be accompanied by some degree of subsidization as standards alone are not always capable of facilitating a rapid change in militaries, including those of NATO members. For example, despite being a member of NATO since 2004, Slovakia has yet to adopt (though it is in the process of doing so) a main service rifle chambered in a NATO standard cartridge and has only just signed documentation on the supply of new armored fighting vehicles that meet NATO standards.74 Generally, lack of funding is the driving force behind slow modernization, and interviews with experts revealed that this is also the case in Slovakia. NATO should therefore work towards subsidization or incentives for green standardization if it is serious about its members’ militaries transitioning into being greener.
Alternatively, if NATO subsidization is, for whatever reasons, unfeasible, partnerships with members or institutions capable of offering subsidies for green military technology may be a viable alternative. This would help make any potential standardization more effective and ensure quicker transition, especially for Central and Eastern European members with lower military budgets and a more urgent need to retire Warsaw pact legacy military equipment.
Militaries across NATO and the world must recognize that their roles in defending their home states and allies will increasingly become multifaceted, combining elements of traditional miliary operations, anti- insurgency warfare, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. Recognizing this now will allow the military institutions to begin new best practices, training, and acknowledge their changing role. Such changes are necessary not only at a practical level but also at a cultural one. If militaries can recognize their changing roles and identities, then equipment and plans can be adapted much faster. This may manifest in several ways, such as an increased interest in procuring a larger helicopter fleet, a greater number of engineering vehicles, and redesigned training facilities capable of being used to simulate disaster relief as well as military operations. Broadly speaking, Slovak and NATO militaries will need to become adept at a generalized approach to threat management.
Within the context of climate security, Slovakia will likely substantially benefit from being a NATO member due to the guaranteed response it will receive from capable partners if it suffers from severe climate change impacts. However, resilience building for the upcoming crises is crucial. Slovakia should be prepared for a highly insecure future, one not only shaped by overt great power competition, but also by acute and chronic crises that are in some way created, shaped, or aggravated by climate change.

About Us

Institute for Central Europe (ICE) is a nonpartisan think tank based in Bratislava, Slovakia. We are committed to examining, promoting, and addressing issues that we feel require greater attention both nationally and internationally. We carry out this mission to support Slovakia and its partners in Europe, NATO, and other international organizations. ICE’s dedicated and diverse international team includes former politicians, ministers, academics, and a variety of subject matter experts.


1 A 2022 survey found that two thirds of Slovak population observe the impacts of climate change in their everyday life, while a third of the adult population worry about climate change. The research is available at https://institut2050.sk/vyskum-slovenska-klima-2022
2 For example, Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991): 211– 39.
3 For example, Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983): 129–53.
4 For more details, see Peter Hough, Environmental Security, 2nd ed. (Routledge: 2021).
5 For example, Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” International Security 19, no. 1(1994): 5–40
6 For example, Geoffrey D. Dabelko and David D. Dabelko, “Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and Redefinition,” ECSP Report 1 (1995): 3–13; Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, eds., Environmental Peacemaking (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002).
7 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (Cambridge University Press, 2022), 9.
8 Ibid, p.9.
9 United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 5 April S/2007/186. Available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27- 4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CC%20S2007%20186.pdf
10 General Assembly, “Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications Report of the Secretary General,” General Assembly 64/350, 11 September. Available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/sg%20report%202009.pdf
11 See Chad Briggs and Miriam Matejova, Disaster Security: Using Intelligence and Military Planning for Energy and Environmental Risks (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
12 The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: The CAN Corporation, 2007).
13 See Jan Selby, Omar S. Dahi, Christiane Frohlich, and Mike Hulme. “Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited,” Political Geography 60 (2017): 232–244.
14 For example, Jim Anderson, “To tackle Climate Change, Take on Corruption,” World Bank Blogs, 22 November 2021, https://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/tackle-climate-change-take-corruption
15 For an in-depth discussion of such impacts, see Peter Hough, Environmental Security, 2nd ed. (Routledge: 2021).
16 Marko Korosec, “Karst Region on Fire – The Largest, Historic Wildfire on Record in Slovenia Spreads Fast under the New Extreme Heat Dome Heatwave Event over Europe,” Extreme Weather Europe, 24 July 2022, https://www.severe-weather.eu/global-weather/heatwave-heat-dome-slovenia-historic-wildfire-karst-summer- july-2022-mk/
17 University of East Anglia, “Climate Change Increases the Risk of Wildfires Confirms New Review,” Science- Daily, 14 January 2020, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/01/200114074046.htm
18 Maïthé Chini, “Storm Ciara: 8 People Died in Europe,” The Brussels Times, 11 February 2020,https://www.brusselstimes.com/94457/storm-ciara-8-people-died-in-europe-czech-republic-germany-poland- sweden-slovenia-great-britain-air-traffic-public-transport-sint-niklaas
19 Chad M. Briggs, Miriam Matejova, and Robert Weiss, “Disaster Intelligence: Developing Strategic Warning for National Security,” Intelligence & National Security 37, no. 7 (2022): 985–1002.
20 Marko Korosec, “The most powerful tornado on record hit the Czech Republic, leaving several fatalities and 200+ injured across the Hodonin district,” Severe Weather Europe, 25 June 2021, https://www.severe-weather.eu/weather-report/europe-severe-weather-tornado-hodonin-czech-republic-mk/
21 ABC News, “Russian heatwave killed 11,000 people,” ABC News, 17 September 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-18/russian-heatwave-killed-11000-people/2265184; see also UNEP report on the 2003 heatwave available at https://www.unisdr.org/files/1145_ewheatwave.en.pdf
22 Jason Horowitz, “Europe’s scorching summer puts unexpected strain on energy supply,” The New York Times, 18 August 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/18/world/europe/drought-heat-energy.html
23 James J. Sejvar, “West Nile Virus: An Historical Overview,” The Ochsner Journal 5, no. 3 (2003): 6–10.
24 See Hugh, Environmental Security.
25 John Sullivan and Keeley Townsend, “Climate Migration: Adding Fuel to the Ethnocentric Fire,” Terrorism and Political Violence 34, no. 5 (2022): 914–925.
26 Graham Macklin, “The Extreme Right, Climate Change and Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 34, no. 5 (2022): 979–996.
27 Angelika Claußen, “War is a climate killer,” IPS, 1 August 2022, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy- and-ecology/war-is-a-climate-killer-6094/
28 This was identified by participants of the public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe on November 25, 2022.
29 This was identified by participants of the public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe on November 25, 2022.
30 This was identified by participants of the public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe on November 25, 2022.
31 See NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ official_texts_185174.htm
32 See https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2022-climate-change-mitigation-and-adaptation-role-technology- report-clement-024-stc#:~:text=NA TO%20Heads%20of%20State%20and,tasks%20(NA TO%2C%202022a)
33 For an overview of NATO’s recent activities in climate security, see Katarina Kertysova, “Towards a Greener Alliance: NATO’s Energy Efficiency and Mitigation Efforts.” In Decarbonized Defence. The Need for Clean Military Power in the Age of Climate Change, produced by IMCCS Expert Group (2022), https://imccs.org/wp- content/uploads/2022/06/Decarbonized-Defense-World-Climate-and-Security-Report-2022-V ol.-I.pdf
34 Summary available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/2106-factsheet- nato2030-en.pdf
35 For a detailed discussion of the challenges that climate change poses for NATO, see the Secretary General’s report: NATO, Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment (2022), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/280622-climate-impact-assessment.pdf
36 Based on discussions during a public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe on November 25, 2022.
37 Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185174.htm. For a summary of best practices see a NATO factsheet available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/7/ pdf/0664- 22_Climate_Change_Compendium_-_V3.pdf
38 Available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/280622-climate-impact- assessment.pdf
39 Sabine Siebold, “NATO aims to cut emissions by 45% by 2030, be carbon neutral by 2050,” Reuters, 28 June 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-cut-emissions-by-45-by-2030-be-carbon-neutral-by-2050- stoltenberg-2022-06-28/
40 Pierre Laboué, “Military Emissions: Measuring is Knowing,” in Decarbonized Defence. The Need for Clean Military Power in the Age of Climate Change, produced by IMCCS Expert Group (2022), https://imccs.org/wp- content/uploads/2022/06/Decarbonized-Defense-World-Climate-and-Security-Report-2022-V ol.-I.pdf
41 Pierre Laboué, “Technological Innovation: Where the Hard Part Begins,” in Decarbonized Defence. The Need for Clean Military Power in the Age of Climate Change, produced by IMCCS Expert Group (2022), https://imccs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Decarbonized-Defense-World-Climate-and-Security-Report- 2022-V ol.-I.pdf
42 David Keating, “Nato disappoints with tepid climate action,” Energy Monitor, 18 July 2022, https://www.energymonitor.ai/policy/nato-disappoints-with-tepid-climate-action/
43 MSMR, “Update: Heat Illness, Active Component, U.S. Armed Forces, 2020,” MSMR 28, no. 4 (2021): 10– 15.
44 Rene Heise, “NATO is responding to new challenges posed by climate change,” NATO Review, 1 April 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/04/01/nato-is-responding-to-new-challenges-posed-by-climate- change/index.html
45 Nick Schifrin, “Report: U.S. bribes to protect convoys are funding Taliban insurgents,” ABC News, 22 June 2010, https://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/united-states-military-funding-taliban- afghanistan/story?id=10980527
46 For a discussion of NATO’s “value-added” to climate security (including standardization and a platform for best practices), see Sherri Goodman and Katarina Kertysova, “NATO: An Unexpected Driver of Climate Action?” NATO Review, 1 February 2022, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/ 2022/02/01/nato-an- unexpected-driver-of-climate-action/index.html
47 Gunter Bloschl et al., “Changing Climate Both Increases and Decreases European River Floods,” Nature 573 (2019): 108–111.
48 Otakar Horak, “Toto leto na Slovensku bolo najteplejsie od pociatku merani. Klimatolog: Perspektiva do buducnosti nie je dobra.” DennikN, 13 September 2022, https://dennikn.sk/3008106/toto-leto-na-slovensku- bolo-najteplejsie-od-pociatku-merani-klimatolog-perspektiva-do-buducnosti-nie-je-dobra/
49 Lars Paulsson and Todd Gillespie, “European heatwave risks curbing French nuclear power production,” Bloomberg, 12 July 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-12/french-nuclear-output-seen- curtailed-as-river-temperatures-rise
50 The index is available at https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/
51 Data available from the International Organization for Migration, at https://www.iom.sk/en/migration/migration-in-slovakia.html#:~:text=Today%20the%20foreigners %20make%20up,means%20an%20increase%20of%2011.7%25
52 John Podesta, “The climate crisis, migration, and refugees,” Brookings, 25 July 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/
53 RTVS, “Slovakia sending firefighters and helicopter to help fight Czech fire,” RTVS, 27 July 2022,https://enrsi.rtvs.sk/articles/news/298708/slovakia-sending-firefighters-and-helicopter-to-help-fight-czech-fire
54 Ankit Panda, “Nearly 10 percent of the US F-22 inventory was damaged or destroyed in Hurricane Michael,” The Diplomat, 15 October 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/nearly-10-percent-of-the-us-f-22-inventory- was-damaged-or-destroyed-in-hurricane-michael/
55 See Miriam Matejova and Chad Briggs, “Embracing the Darkness: Methods for Tackling Uncertainty and Complexity in Environmental Disaster Risks,” Global Environmental Politics 21, no. 1 (2021): 76–88; Briggs et al., “Disaster Intelligence.”
56 Available at https://www.climate-laws.org/geographies/slovakia/policies/slovakia-s-integrated-national- energy-and-climate-plan-for-2021-to-2030
57 Available at https://www.minzp.sk/iep/strategicke-materialy/envirostrategia-2030.html
58 Available at https://www.minzp.sk/files/iep/greener_slovakia-strategy_of_the_environmental_policy_ of_the_slovak_republic_until_2030.pdf
59 Available at https://www.mzv.sk/documents/30297/4638226/security-strategy-of-the-slovak-republic.pdf
60 This is based on the discussions with participants in the public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe on November 25, 2022.
61 Available at https://www.mosr.sk/data/files/4857_2022-b-06-zasobnik-opatreni-pre-zelenu-obranu.pdf
62 This is based on the discussions with participants in the public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe on November 25, 2022.
63 Based on interviews conducted by the Institute for Central Europe in the fall of 2022.
64 Based on the discussions with participants in the public workshop organized by the Institute for Central Europe on November 25, 2022.
65 A brief discussion available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/slovakian-ga-drilling-has- been-awarded-the-solar-impulse-efficient-solution-label/
66 Wei-Ru Chang et al. “Environmental Impact and Sustainability Study on Biofuels for Transportation Applications,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 67 (2017): 277–288.
67 Andrew Eversden, “Oshkosh Defense announces first hybrid electric JLTV,” Breaking Defense, 25 January 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/oshkosh-defense-announces-first-hybrid-electric-jltv/
68 Eversden, “Oshkosh Defence.”
69 Based on interviews with Slovak defence industry representatives in fall 2022.
70 Some information on CADMID is available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/422475/Sectio n4v22final.pdf
71 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/procurement-policy-note-0621-taking-account-of- carbon-reduction-plans-in-the-procurement-of-major-government-contracts
72 Discussion available at https://rusi.org/podcasts/greening-defence/episode-2-sustainable-defence
73 STANAG 4172, available at https://nso.nato.int/nso/home/main/home
74 Ola Thorén, “Slovakia signs $1.37 billion deal for 152 CV90s under government-to-government agreement,” BAE Systems, 12 December 2022, https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/slovakia-signs-deal-for-152-cv90s- under-government-to-government-agreement

Climate Security in Central Europe: Challenges and Opportunities – Summary of a Public Workshop

On November 25, 2022, the Institute for central Europe (ICE) held an online workshop entitled “Climate Security in Central Europe: Challenges and Opportunities.” This was one of three parts of a broader project on climate security that ICE has been implementing in the fall of 2022. The project (ACCESS – Addressing the Challenges of Climate, dEfence and Security nexus) has been funded through NATO Public Diplomacy Programmes, and its goals include – within the Slovak context – awareness raising on the climate-security/defense nexus, seeking innovative ideas and solutions to the issues of climate security, and finding opportunities to link NATO’s past, current, and future efforts with Slovak climate security needs.

Within this project, the purpose of the public workshop was to discuss with various experts and the public climate security in general and within Central European context and Slovakia in particular. The workshop was divided into two parts. In the first part, invited speakers from the University of Liege in Belgium (keynote), NATO, and the Slovak Ministry of Defence (MOD) spoke about climate security within their respective areas of expertise. The second part of the workshop opened with an academic panel with speakers from Johns Hopkins University, the University of Bath, and the European Leadership Network. 

Several main takeaways arise from the first part of the workshop. While the public and the media tend to focus on the conflict potential of climate change, for armed forces there are also other concerns that are both operational and strategic. Operationally, military adaptation to climate change is crucial since most of the current equipment (e.g., sonars, helicopters) does not function properly in warmer climates. Military bases around the world are vulnerable to the sea level rise and desertification. There is also a need for long-term planning and investment that incorporate climate considerations and a methodology for assessing the vulnerability of the bases in light of climate change. 

In terms of strategic risks for armed forces, the key missions of the armies are changing with the growing requests for post-disaster humanitarian assistance and emergency relief. Many national armies are lacking sufficient equipment and training for such missions. One short-term solution is more cooperation with the civil society. Another strategic risk is the potential internal destabilization of countries due to effects of climate change, with cascading regional impacts. Potential tensions around land and food supply cannot be overlooked as these also provide opportunities for extremist recruitment and growth of extremist ideologies as the legitimacy of many states weakens. A remedy may be addressing the cause rather than mere symptoms of instability – for example, addressing the root causes of land degradation and incorporating such objectives into defence and security doctrines. 

Overall, we need a better understanding of cascading effects of climate change. We also need a greater cooperation among the defence and security community, between countries, and within organizations like NATO. There is a further need to adjust defence thinking to account for altered landscapes and the changing climate in recruitment and personnel training.

Technology transfers from the Global North to South are essential – Europe must invest into resilient infrastructure and climate technologies now and transfer those technologies to Africa and Asia. Such investments, especially in energy infrastructure, have future geopolitical implications. 

Considering the challenges of climate change, NATO and its member states, including Slovakia, have produced a number of strategic documents, action plans, and toolkits with best practices for both climate adaptation and mitigation. Climate change is a priority for NATO whose current commitments include reduction of GHG emissions from military activities and facilities as well as plans to increase awareness and data sharing. The 2021 NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan sets out to increase awareness, adapt, contribute to mitigation, and enhance outreach with partner countries and organizations. NATO’s strengths in climate security are leading by example, setting standards, advising, and providing a forum for discussing best practices. To varying degrees, militaries across the Alliance are prepared to engage in humanitarian rescue and disaster relief. However, acquiring sufficient equipment with the right type of equipment is crucial. It is also imperative for NATO to work with academia, industry, member states, and other partners, and to keep investing in both the military and climate to ensure regional and global security. 

Slovakia is also aware of climate security challenges and opportunities. The Slovak MOD aims to initiate interdepartmental discussions to help reduce the impact that departmental activities have on the environment – this includes both the ministry and the armed forces. Target areas include energy consumption, energy efficiency, and green procurement as well as a reduction in GHG emissions produced by the civilian motor vehicle fleet. There is currently no legislative requirement to reduce GHG emissions from the military vehicles, and a more significant application of green initiatives on the Slovak armed forces is lacking. Reasons include lack of awareness of the problem or of suitable solutions; although, the Department plans to work on addressing these issues through the use of various toolkits and awareness programs. A key issue for the near future is the readiness of the armed forces to face the risks of climate change, both from an operational and strategic perspective. 

In the second part of the workshop, panelists addressed questions of preparedness and future needs in climate security of Central Europe. Among the main regional security concerns are the weaponization of narratives that use migration and nationalism, and the general ability of adversaries to strategically use climate change to undermine democratic institutions. For Central Europe, climate change is not a distant phenomenon; it will affect energy security and infrastructure, among many other things. 

Potential solutions to the challenges of climate security in both Central Europe and Slovakia include a private-public cooperation and a better communication of the costs of climate change, both human and financial. It is also crucial to increase state capability to respond to major disasters and its ability to house (and provide services to) migrants, and in general, to increase strategic foresight capabilities. Since national lens may be unfeasible in the Central European context with sharp divergences in energy and other policies, focusing on common context, common frameworks, and common ways of looking at the problem and solutions may be more productive. Both for NATO and its members, it is crucial to invest in new technologies, allocate some defence spending to R&D, ensure interoperability, provide political incentives to large defence companies, and bring start-ups into the discussion.

A Time for Action and Alignment: Climate Security in Slovakia

Climate security remains a concern, but a tertiary one, for Slovakia. This is one conclusion drawn from recent interviews with various relevant experts in Slovakia conducted as part of a NATO-funded project of the Institute for Central Europe. The reasons behind the relative lack of tangible action in Slovakia on climate security does not lie so much with Slovak disinterest in climate security but in multiple competing priorities and a lack of direction in key partner institutions and allies. Fortunately, while the aforementioned issues present a strategic problem, at a more local level, Slovak industries have pushed ahead with initiatives that save on energy, diversify energy sources, and generally improve efficiency. A combination of incentives and disincentives have created this situation in the Slovak industry, and some have little to do with climate change. 

The Slovak Ministry of Defence has been assessing the implications of climate change for Slovakia’s security and defence, both at a domestic and international level. Consideration is being given to the global impacts of climate change as well as more specific effects in Slovakia in the context of its obligations through various international agreements and organizations such as NATO. A pressing concern is the arming of the Slovak military with modern equipment to deter Russian aggression and contribute to the collective security of NATO. With no NATO standardization on green technologies there is no emphasis on green technologies in Slovakia’s recent armoured vehicle acquisitions, and likely there will not be any in the near future either. The only way this may change is if critical NATO members like the USA truly embrace military greening and push norms across the Alliance. Until then, discussions around the greening of NATO militaries are likely to be unproductive.

Slovak defence industries, however, are very interested in green initiatives, and particularly those that can offer incentives and cost savings. The ongoing energy crisis is substantially increasing the rate of greening of defence production as companies take advantage of the EU funds to install less energy intensive equipment and on-site electrical generation through the use of photovoltaic panels. It is best practice for industry to engage in significant efficiency increases and cost decreases for financial reasons rather than due to purely climate security concerns. The intersection with EU subsidies for certain energy saving technologies is fortunate and potentially shows a mutually beneficial opportunity for cooperation between organizations ostensibly concerned with climate security and industry. Such synergies will only be possible for the defence industry where cost savings or financial incentives can be offered.

A national obligation: Modern air and missile defence for Slovakia

ICE analyst Fred Hardmann Lea discusses the responsibility of a government to protect its citizens. The air defence needs to be considered as one of the main elements of a country defence in general.
Institute for Central Europe has conducted project “Air and missile Defence of Slovakia”, kindly supported by the Slovak Ministry of Defence. We have finished the summary analysis and provided it to the MoD as a part of public expert debate on this important and complex issue.

Any government, regardless of party or ideology, has the responsibility to protect its citizens. It is the oldest and most important responsibility that a government has. In the 21st century this means that governments must ensure that their national air space is controlled and protected from air-based threats to the greatest extent practically possible. One need only look to Slovakia’s immediate east to understand why. Cruise and ballistic missiles, rockets, drones, artillery shells, and bombs rain down across Ukraine, killing and maiming soldiers and civilians indiscriminately. Only where air defences intercept these attacks is there any safety or reprieve for Ukrainians. To witness this and not look to protect Slovak citizens from such an assault would be irresponsible at best.

Sitting, as Slovakia does, under the NATO umbrella, it can be tempting to think that the country is already protected against any type of assault. However, NATO is not a magic wand that makes security threats disappear. In the event of being attacked and triggering of Article 5 of the NATO charter, it would take at least two weeks for NATO ground forces, including air defences, to arrive in Slovakia. Slovakia must therefore be prepared to defend itself until assistance arrives. This further necessitates having a modern integrated air defence system (IADS), large numbers of interceptors (effectors), and enough skilled Slovak soldiers to operate all air defence equipment.

Unfortunately, current Slovak air defences are inadequate, and Slovakia does not operate an integrated air defence system. This makes Slovakia vulnerable at a time that the risk of air attack is increasing. Slovakia, through an act of generosity, removed the lynch pin of its legacy air defence system by transferring its long range S300PMU air defence systems to Ukraine. Now all that is left in its inventory are a few obsolete Kub missile batteries and fewer than 100 MANPADS (shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles). It is this poor equipment inventory that leaves Slovakia with the weakest surface-based air defence system it has possessed in its history. 

Fortunately, this situation is solvable, and Slovakia possesses several advantages that it can leverage in overhauling its air and missile defences. Slovak air defence officers and soldiers are well trained and highly skilled, building off a legacy inherited from Czechoslovakia of operating one of the most effective surface-based air defence networks in Europe. Additionally, some essential elements to create an effective IADS have already been acquired such as new radars from Israel, and soon, new multirole combat aircraft from the USA. What is needed now are new weapons and command and control systems. None of the old equipment is up to the task of defending Slovakia, so it should be scrapped, sold, or transferred. Then, a suite of modern short, medium, long-range, point defence, and counter-UAV (drone) air defence systems should be acquired, backed up by a command-and-control system that can coordinate air and missile defences. With these purchases Slovakia could defend itself far better, deter potential attackers, and mitigate the risk posed by air, missile, and drone attacks.  

This would, of course, be an expensive process, far too expensive to undertake through one budget cycle or even one government administration. Air and missile defence systems are some of the most expensive weapons in the world.  Additionally, more Slovak soldiers may be required to operate new equipment, and this could require new training and housing facilities. Thus, Slovakia will likely have to spread the air and missile defence modernization process over the course of ten years. To facilitate this, total buy-in from across the Slovak political spectrum must be achieved. Air and missile defence is too important to allow to become a political tool or weapon used to score cheap political points at the expense of national security.

Frederick Hardman Lea

Southeast Asia, the market for Slovak defence exports?

The Institute for Central Europe is pleased to be the first organization, besides those involved in the deal, to obtain this information.

Malaysia will shortly conclude a deal for the Slovak made EVA wheeled self-propelled artillery. The final specifics of the Malaysian purchase have yet to be finalized, but it is anticipated that the order will be in the range of 16-18 pieces. Further details regarding production and potential licensing have not been revealed at this time. This deal will be the first export, and indeed order of, the EVA wheeled self-propelled howitzer.

Slovakia appears to be on something of a winning defence export success streak. Ukraine has bought and is now fielding EVA’s bigger sister, the ZUZANA 2. While to date only four of these systems have arrived in Ukraine, there is a contract for eight and the option for more deliveries in the future. Many observers will be keenly watching how this performs and undoubtedly measuring it up against its competitors that are also used in Ukraine. Current estimates suggest ZUZANA 2’s use will be most likely in the autumn when Ukraine will have completed crew training and has possession of all eight systems and can therefore operate a full battery of ZUZANA 2.



The successes of Slovak artillery exports are unlikely to stop at Malaysia and Ukraine as there is additional interest, particularly in EVA, in the Southeast Asian market. Both ZUZANA 2 and EVA have been recognized as top contenders for the upcoming Indonesian procurement plan for a wheeled self-propelled howitzer system. While Indonesia has purchased EVA’s competitor Caesar for its army, its Marine Corps has often operated different systems due to different operational requirements for its equipment. The successful export of EVA to neighbouring Malaysia will show the viability of the design and the ability of Slovak companies to strike attractive deals.

This potential is very real given the excellent performance achievable with the full suite of Slovak artillery offerings from the wheeled designs of ZUZANA 2 and EVA to the tracked DIANA. All three of these systems are in the NATO standard calibre of 155mm, with long 52 calibre guns for better range, and all possess multiple round simultaneous impact (MRSI) capability whereby they can fire several shells in staggered succession, so they impact as a single volley. In terms of distinguishing capability, EVA is the fastest on road of the family (at 90km/h on road and 30km/h off road). It offers good range at 41km (with the possibility to extend this further with specific ammunition types) and the highest operational range of action at 700km (how far it can travel in one trip). Like the rest of the family, it is equipped with an autoloader, helping keep the crew to three persons. This crew is well protected and cared for in an enclosed cabin complete with NBC protection and air conditioning (an often-overlooked asset that can be of real value in certain climates, most of which EVA can handle with a -30° to 50° operational temperature range). These attributes are well complemented by a quick set-up time and an excellent fire control system (FCS).

The above attributes are just a quick look at EVA’s capabilities. ZUZANA 2 and DIANA have their own unique characteristics that might make them more appealing under certain circumstances to specific customers. This is vital given that the market for Slovak artillery will not end in Malaysia or Indonesia. Sticking just to the Southeast Asian markets there are other potential customers and for practical and policy reasons both Russia and China will likely struggle in these markets in the coming years. While Western companies have fared better, there remains a great opportunity for Slovakia. For example, several years ago Vietnam was reportedly interested in the French Caesar. However, this to no purchases despite some reports to the contrary.
Perhaps the French loss could be a Slovak gain? Certainly, it looks like Southeast Asia could be the region that may secure the export future of Slovak artillery.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

Filling the gap – Russian withdrawal from global defense markets: An opportunity for Slovakia and its ZUZANA 2?

The Russian war in Ukraine also means the decisions of many states to invest more in their defenses. This means an opportunity to revitalize the arms industry in Slovakia as well. How can Slovakia handle the upcoming opportunities? And what are the opportunities for the howitzer Zuzana 2, which is one of the few comprehensive weapons products that Slovak companies can produce? Ukraine is interested in them, but the possibilities are much greater…
More in the analysis by Fred.

Success in the European markets will be a fight for the ZUZANA 2 mobile artillery system requiring the full backing of the Slovak government, lobbying, and luck. However, ZUZANA 2 may find easer adoption globally as defense markets change in response to the War in Ukraine. CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions look set to be applied more aggressively by the USA than ever before as a response to the Russian invasion. CAATSA provides a significant deterrence to purchasing Russian equipment by providing a legal avenue for applying economic sanctions against Russian defense customers. At the same time, export restrictions on Russia mean that critical subcomponents can no longer be sourced for sophisticated Russian defense products like aircraft, armoured vehicles, air defense systems, artillery, and precision munitions. This means Russia will struggle to meet existing export agreements and may be unable to secure future sales agreements. Taken together these two circumstances will significantly hamper Russian defense exports for the foreseeable future. ZUZANA 2 and other Slovak defense products must be promoted to fill this emerging market gap.



To illustrate the viability of this idea it is necessary to appreciate why some countries choose to purchase Russian defense equipment. Generally, there are four reasons states purchase Russian equipment: as a way of maintaining an independent foreign policy, due to historically good relations with Russia and so owning large inventories of Soviet/Russian equipment, because they face an existential threat from Russia and therefore purchase defense goods as a subservient gesture, or because they are pariah states and so Russian weaponry is their only available option. Often these reasons can intersect. Russian defense customers are therefore distributed globally with significant purchases made in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucuses, Africa, and to a lesser extent, South America. So how could Slovakia and its defense products supplant Russian defense sales in some of these regions? Obviously, understanding the motivation of specific customers is key. Slovakia should focus on those Russian customers looking to follow an independent foreign policy and/or those who have large inventories of Russian/Soviet equipment. Suitable target customers include but are not limited to: India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Egypt, and Algeria. Many of these states choose Russian defense equipment because for them it comes with less problematic geopolitical implications compared to American or Chinese alternatives (such as Vietnam) or because purchasing from just one region would risk them being beholden to governments who may use defense sales as diplomatic/political leverage (this is the motivation for Saudi Arabia and Egypt and is typically aimed at avoiding being totally beholden to the USA). Even those states who remain willing to purchase Russian equipment (such as India) will be unable to do so as Russian production grinds to a halt. With these needs no longer capable of being met by Russia there is now space for European defense companies to step in, and especially companies based in countries like Slovakia that are motivated more by economic rather than geopolitical concerns. Slovakia does not use its defense products as a tool for coercing sovereign states as opposed to companies based in places like France and UK that might be used as diplomatic tools, therefore Slovakia is the ideal defense supplier for states wishing to maintain an independent foreign policy. Slovak companies such as Konštrukta Defence and many others are perfectly positioned to exploit this opportunity having extensive experience in maintaining and updating Soviet style weaponry, as well as producing new defense products that would be suitable replacements for Russian equipment. It is in these circumstances that ZUZANA 2 is most likely to see major success.

Obviously Slovak defense companies will face significant competition, but the world market is large enough and Slovak defense products competitive enough that this is not an immediate concern. In the case of ZUZANA 2 likely competition will come from Israel’s ATMOS 2000, Serbia’s Nora B-52, France’s Caesar, Sweden’s Archer and other nascent systems yet to be fielded. ZUZANA 2 can compete with all of these, and where it struggles other Slovak products might be put forward such as the yet to be purchased EVA artillery system.

For anyone who doubts the viability of this export strategy they should understand it has historical precedent, especially for Slovakia. The inter war years (1919-1938) saw Czechoslovakia become one of the world’s premier arms producers by following a similar strategy, producing high quality armaments for independent countries who wanted to limit their exposure to the great games of great powers. Slovakia is well positioned to follow a similar path. It has a variety of native defense products and shared defense projects that could very easily be export successes. ZUZANA 2 is emblematic of these but there are several others. By pursuing global markets for its products Slovakia can follow a path that made is predecessor state one of hubs of the global defense industry.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

ZUZANA 2 and the future of Slovak defense exports in Europe

Slovak howitzer Zuzana is one of the few comprehensive products of the Slovak armaments industry. It has recently come to international attention again due to the possibility of its sale to Ukraine.
In his article, Fred analyzes the opportunities of the Slovak howitzer also in the context of modernization projects in our neighbors…

Recent defense news from Hungary suggests it is close to securing a deal with Rheinmetall for the procurement of its new HX3 mobile howitzer. Between this and the Czech adoption of the French Caesar there is significant frustration in Slovakia concerning the lack of European export success of the ZUZANA 2 mobile artillery system. ZUZANA 2 is a very capable and competitive system whose lack of export success defies its technical qualities. However, there are new opportunities emerging for the ZUZANA 2 and other Slovak defense products as a wave of political will for rearmament sweeps Europe.



ZUZANA 2 ostensibly lost to Caesar in Czech trials due to lower cost estimates (that have now increased) and supposedly the greater variety of 155mm ammunition types that Caesar is rated to fire. Caesar adoption by Czechia is questionable and sacrificed a century of Czechoslovak independence in artillery production. It is highly likely that the ZUZANA 2 can fire all 155mm shell types, could have been acquired for less cost per unit than the Caesar, is better protected, has greater accessory options, better features, and would have promoted regional defense integration. Even Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová hints that ZUZANA 2 might have been a better choice1. In contrast the Hungarian political decision to select the HX3 155mm is more understandable, although the apparent decision to adopt without a competition is not ideal from the perspective of ensuring free and fair procurement processes in Europe and could, if established as a trend, risk the Hungarian military being equipped with sub-optimal equipment.

However, given Hungary’s excellent relationship with Rheinmetall and the specifications of the HX3 155mm itself it is perhaps not surprising Hungary might consider a competition unnecessary. The HX3 155mm so far looks similar to ZUZANA 2 with its prototypes possessing many of the features that Caesar lacks. Where the HX3 stands out is in its future development. Reportedly, the Hungarian acquisition of the HX3 will aim at incorporating Rheinmetall’s new L60 gun, which being longer and with a larger breech can fire rounds further more economically. ZUZANA 2 and other 55 calibre artillery systems (including the HX3 with its standard gun) still have significant reach with Vulcano 155mm rounds pushing an 80km range, but the L60 can do this at a lower cost with less sophisticated ammunition types and should be able to reach further than 80km with Vulcano rounds. Where ZUZANA 2 may have an edge over the HX3 could be cost, although this is speculation due to the limited cost data available.

Exporting ZUZANA 2 is both a matter of practicality and national pride in Slovakia. Slovakia knows it has a winning system but has struggled to find its place in the European market. This is changing. Wheeled artillery is increasingly popular and is often fielded as a complement to tracked artillery vehicles. The main advantages wheeled systems have over tracked are reduced maintenance costs, maintenance needs, and faster speeds (on road). Possible opportunities for ZUZANA 2 in the European market exist in Poland, Croatia, Finland, and the Baltic states (there are many outside of Europe but this is discussed in an upcoming article). Finland in particular is an interesting case that could provide a model for advancing ZUZANA 2 sales. It has new tracked howitzers entering service being supported by older systems (the ubiquitous Gvozdika) in need of replacement. Here, Slovakia could use its own likely procurement of Finland’s Patria AMV to incentivize the Finnish government to consider procuring ZUZANA 2.

In a similar way it seems like both Hungary and Slovakia missed an opportunity to secure procurement deals for one another’s vehicles. Hungary is the partner of Rheinmetall in the current Slovak tracked IFV tender (offering the Lynx IFV). Given Slovakia’s use of government-to-government deals in its procurement projects it is possible that a deal could have been worked out where Slovakia agreed to adopt the Lynx while Hungary adopts the ZUZANA 2.  Regardless of whether this would be realistic it shows that Slovakia could use its own procurement projects to further the export potential of ZUZANA 2 by promoting deals that mutually benefit the domestic industries of all parties involved.

For ZUZANA 2 to become the export success it was expected to be there needs to be a serious government backed effort to market this system in novel ways that play to Slovakia’s strengths and make use of Slovakia’s own rearmament efforts. Understanding the variety of European market options available and promoting ZUZANA 2 in a way that takes advantage of the specific circumstances of each bid is the first step.


1Vojáček, J. (2021, November 20). Future Minister of Defense: We should get rid of Soviet technology. iDnes.cz. https://www.idnes.cz/technet/vojenstvi/jana-cernochova-vize-armada-vyzbroj-tendr-akvizice-ministryne-obrany.A211118_163107_vojenstvi_alv


Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

Slovak armour for the 21st century

Fred briefly wrote about the favorites in the historically largest tender on the Slovak defense, which can reach up to 2 billion euros.

Slovakia needs a new tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to supplement, and eventually replace, the BVP and the more capable BVP 2 vehicles currently in service. IFVs are armoured personnel carriers that are designed to both bring troops to the battlefield and to fight in support of them. The Cold War origins of the BVP mean that while it remains a capable platform, its survivability and lethality on the modern battlefield are slowly decreasing. By replacing the BVP and BVP 2, Slovakia will also have an opportunity to increase its military compatibility with NATO. Slovakia will be looking for a well protected, mobile, and well armed IFV that is sufficiently advanced to justify the expenditure. It is also a likely demand, and always a welcome feature, that a future IFV has some of its parts produced domestically.

The Slovak Ministry of Defence (MoD) is expecting eight proposals from different companies to meet this tender. However, with the political decision to keep Korean and Turkish companies out of the competition, we expect that there are only four IFVs that are likely to meet Slovak expectations: Rheinmetall’s Lynx, General Dynamics’ ASCOD, BAE’s CV90, and Projekt System & Management GmbH’s (PSM) Puma.

These vehicles are all highly capable platforms. They are all built around modularity to allow for increased flexibility in the types of missions they can perform. There are pros and cons to each choice, and through a brief analysis we can see that of the four options there are two that stand out as candidates for a Slovak tracked IFV.

1) The Puma is an excellent IFV designed for the German Bundeswehr. It is the best choice for the German military, but perhaps not for Slovakia. The Puma has been designed with input from many German companies. This makes adapting the Puma to Slovak needs more difficult as there are many vendors that need consulting. This lack of design flexibility is reportedly the reason that the Puma dropped out of the Czech IFV competition. When the Czechs changed the parameters of the competition, PSM decided that it was not worthwhile to redesign their vehicle to continue. This, in combination with a probable high initial and lifetime (for example in spare parts) costs, makes the Puma an unlikely choice for a future Slovak IFV.

2) General Dynamics’ ASCOD is an advanced and highly adaptable IFV design that has been adopted in different forms by several militaries. This adaptability may be the biggest attraction for Slovakia. With the need to steadily replace non-NATO standard equipment, the ASCOD could provide a common chassis for projects beyond an IFV. For example, a SAM version of the ASCOD could be used to replace the obsolescent “Kub” systems currently in service. The commonality of parts between IFV and SHORAD systems would provide a simplified logistics chain. However, there have been recent quality control issues with the UK version of ASCOD (UK designation AJAX), which may have damaged the reputation of the ASCOD. Yet, the ASCOD has proven to be a success in its Ulan form in neighbouring Austria. This suggests that the ASCOD could be a suitable choice of IFV for Slovakia.

This leaves the two standout options for Slovakia, the CV90 and Lynx.

3) The CV90 is an excellent and proven design. It has been heavily customized for a variety of customer demands and can easily be configured for Slovak needs. As should be expected of a vehicle with Swedish origin, it has outstanding mobility in winter conditions. A Slovak partner for the CV90 should be easy to find. The unique selling point of the CV-90, when compared to the other vehicles on this list, is its exemplary combat and service history. It has active combat in Afghanistan with Norway and Denmark, proving itself to be a highly effective IFV. Its service with seven different countries means that lifetime cost data are readily available, which unlike for the Lynx means that total project costs are easier to predict.

4) The Lynx is a very well protected modern IFV made by Rheinmetall. Much like the ASCOD it can be configured in many different ways. Some technology that went into the design of the Puma has been incorporated into the Lynx. However, unlike the consortium behind the sale of the Puma, Rheinmetall has shown impressive flexibility in working with potential operators. Rheinmetall has advertised the Lynx as a cost-effective platform that can be easily updated to meet the demands of the modern battlefield. This can be seen in its ability to use the AMAP-ADS active protection system. However, the cost effectiveness of the Lynx is hard to determine due its limited service thus far. The recent selection of the Lynx by Hungary included some elements of domestic production (former state owned company in Moldava), which could be an incentive for its purchase by Slovakia if a similar deal could be reached. However, it is worth considering that the selection of a new IFV is also a political process as much as it is a practical one. This is born out by the exclusion of Israel, Turkey, and Korea from the IFV tender. The tensions between the Hungarian government and the European Union may make the Slovak government reticent about following the Hungarian lead in selecting the Lynx.

For now, determining the likely Slovak IFV remains speculative. Any of the mentioned vehicles could be viable options for Slovakia and would represent a significant improvement over the BVP platforms currently in use. The choice of IFV will likely be determined by issues beyond simple capability, with domestic partnerships and chassis use in other projects being key considerations.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

Fred’s remark on Slovak 8×8 Armoured Fighting Vehicle tender

In response to a request for submissions for a new armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) from the Slovak government five designs have been submitted. Spain has submitted their Dragon AFV, Romanian has submitted a version of the Piranha V, the USA is offering their Stryker platform, Czechia is offering their configuration of the Pandur II, and Finland is offering the Patria AMV.

Interestingly the Dragon, Piranha, and Stryker are all derivatives of the same design, the MOWAG Piranha.
Arguably there are therefore only three truly unique designs in this competition so far. Indeed, given that the same company (General Dynamics Land Systems) is behind both the Pandur, and Piranha designs it is questionable if there is a significant difference in the design between the two vehicles. The Slovak AFV competition therefore appears to be the offerings of GDLS against the single entry of Patria. There is no inherent issue with three designs from the same company being submitted to this type of competition although it is questionable whether this strategy is worth the effort.

The Stryker AFV has seen very little export success, receiving only a minor Thai contract outside of the USA. The design itself is no longer cutting edge and it would be very surprising if this was the competition winner.
The Piranha V is undoubtedly the strongest GDLS contender being the most armoured and adaptable of their offerings. It is likely that the Pandur is being offered due to its current use by Czechia and Austria proving the regional suitability of the design (a feature shared by the Patria AMV which is operated in Poland).

The Pandur is a less competitive offering the Piranha V or Patria AMV in terms of features but might be offered at a lower price and with the selling point of regional cooperation between the Czech and Slovak militaries and industries.

It is therefore likely that this competition will be between the Piranha V (either the Romanian or Spanish versions) and the Patria AMV.

These are both strong and proven designs which should suit the needs of the Slovak military. It remains to be seen how Slovak military industry will be incorporated into any deal made and this may prove to be a significant factor in the final decision.

A final interesting feature of this competition is the conspicuous absences of the German Boxer, French VCBI, and Turkish FNSS Pars and/or Otokar Arma from the current offers. Perhaps the lack of amphibious capability for most of these vehicles held them back in this competition.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

An opportunity for Central European air forces

Niektoré štáty aj v strednej Európe zvažujú prezbrojenie svojich vzdušných síl novými nadzvukovými stíhačkami. Okrem iných nevyhnutností, treba zabezpečiť aj adekvátnu úroveň výcviku. Napriek stále lepším simulačným technológiám, podzvukové letectvo ostáva ako dôležitý element výcviku. Náš analytik Fred Hardman Lea ukazuje na možnosti, ktoré budú mať vlády našich krajín pri úvahách o ďalšom prezbrojení vzdušných síl podzvukovými lietadlami.
(Článok je v angličtine)

Popular military analysis tends to focus on who has the latest and most sophisticated hardwarewithout paying closer attention to programs needed to utilize this hardware effectively. Pilot training is a prime example. As combat jets become increasingly more sophisticated, pilots need more and better training to utilize them. Yet, training projects have increasingly suffered funding cuts to allocate more resources to the acquisition of front-line combat aircraft. Of course, reducing the training budgets is hugely counter-productive as it reduces the capability of new and current pilots and while the negative impacts incurred by funding cuts have been mitigated by increasingly effective flight simulators, there is a need for pilots to amass real flight hours to effectively use advanced supersonic jets

In Central Europe, Slovakia and Poland are purchasing new frontline combat jets, while Czechia, Austria, and Hungary are looking to update or change theirs. These will be some of the most expensive programs ever undertaken by these air forces. Expensive projects like these cannot be undertaken without an opportunity cost. Typically, this could manifest as cutbacks to training programs or the jets used for them, subsequently reducing pilots’ capabilities and resulting in maintenance costs for frontline supersonic aircraft that are forced into the training role. The positive impact of these expensive air force overhauls would be reduced. The best way to avoid this and ensure that new purchases reach their full potential is through a Central European jettraining built around a suitable jet trainer that shares costs and benefits among participants. This will involve sharing airframes, facility locations, maintenance, purchasing, flight hours, and jobs, while integrating relevant existing public and private organizations into the training program.

Jet training programs date back to the closing days of the Second World War. They became more important as the capability and complexity of frontline combat aircraft increased (e.g., with the introduction of supersonic aircraft in the 1950s). Training programs reduce risk to pilots and airframes by using specially configured jets (advanced trainers), which have much lower operational and airframe costs than frontline supersonic aircraft. A modern jet training program,shared among Central European states, should consider advanced trainers with several criteria:• The hourly cost of operations should be low;

  • Their initial cost must be much lower than combat supersonic aircraft;
  • Fuel consumption must be much lower than combat supersonic aircraft;
  • Distance, duration, range should mimic combat supersonic aircraft;
  • Equipment, avionics, and systems should be as close as possible or the same as combat supersonic aircraft;
  • Flight characteristics and handling should be as close as possible to supersonic combat aircraft;
  • There should be the option to upgrade the platform as the primary supersonic combat jet is updated.

Therefore, an acceptable trainer for a common Central European jet training program needs to be suitable for transitioning to Saab’s Gripen (for Hungary and Czechia, although these states could adopt new platforms) and Lockheed Martin’s F-16 (for Slovakia, Poland, and other potential regional partners like Bulgaria and Romania). To attract Poland and ensure the program’s longevity, the training program and aircraft chosen should be suitable for transitioning to the F-35. Currently, Poland is the only regional state that seeks to operate this aircraft, but it is possible that other states will transition to the F-35 in the future. Additionally, any advanced trainer chosen must be cheaper to operate than the Gripen ($4,700 per hour), F-16 ($7,000 per hour), or F-35 ($31,000 per hour). There are several aircraft producers that could meet these demands. Aero has a long history of aircraft production and specializing in advanced trainers. Its L-39 has remained a popular trainer, with a new model entering the market (L-39NG). As a native company to Central Europe, it is likely that they would be included in any discussion related to a shared training program. An additional benefit to incorporating Aero into a regional training program is the very low operational cost of their L-39NG ($2,500 per hour). An interesting contender is Korean Air Industries (KAI) with its supersonic T-50 (designed in partnership with Lockheed Martin). Itsoperational costs are also low at an estimated $3,100 per hour. A recent memorandum of understanding between KAI and the Slovak state-owned defense company Letecké opravovneTrenčín, a.s. indicates KAI’s regional interest. Other potential companies include BAE with their Advanced Hawk (a subsonic design), Saab and Boeing with their newly developed T-7 Red Hawk (a supersonic design), and Leonardo with their M-346 (a transonic design).

Any proposed Central European jet training initiative must incorporate existing state and non-state organizations already involved in training and/or aircraft maintenance. This safeguards jobs, preserves experience, and protects national interests. Getting buy-in from these organizations (such as Czech state-owned enterprise LOM Prague) should not be hard as most have seen their size reduced due to budgetary restrictions and trainer fleet reductions (e.g., the Czech air force selling the majority of its L-159 training fleet to Draken International, interestingly making Draken International the largest operator of this model ). Regional players are more likely to join in if training assets are fairly distributed and relevant domestic industries along with a suitable, cost-effective airframe are involved. A regional jet training program could also be linked with projects sponsored by important strategic organizations. NATO’s Flight Training Europe (NFTE) initiative, for example, seeks to create a network of pilot training institutions across Europe. The first training centres for this have opened this month in Italy, but if NATO wishes to see further cooperation from its Central European members then integrating a regional jet training program into the NFTE is an excellent path to achieving this (the only Central European NFTE members so far are Czechia and Hungary)Integrating regional training programs helps strengthen the alliance through common training practices and provide greater opportunity for regional air force exercises.