Autor vibration

The Institute for Central Europe is pleased to be the first organization, besides those involved in the deal, to obtain this information.

Malaysia will shortly conclude a deal for the Slovak made EVA wheeled self-propelled artillery. The final specifics of the Malaysian purchase have yet to be finalized, but it is anticipated that the order will be in the range of 16-18 pieces. Further details regarding production and potential licensing have not been revealed at this time. This deal will be the first export, and indeed order of, the EVA wheeled self-propelled howitzer.

Slovakia appears to be on something of a winning defence export success streak. Ukraine has bought and is now fielding EVA’s bigger sister, the ZUZANA 2. While to date only four of these systems have arrived in Ukraine, there is a contract for eight and the option for more deliveries in the future. Many observers will be keenly watching how this performs and undoubtedly measuring it up against its competitors that are also used in Ukraine. Current estimates suggest ZUZANA 2’s use will be most likely in the autumn when Ukraine will have completed crew training and has possession of all eight systems and can therefore operate a full battery of ZUZANA 2.

The successes of Slovak artillery exports are unlikely to stop at Malaysia and Ukraine as there is additional interest, particularly in EVA, in the Southeast Asian market. Both ZUZANA 2 and EVA have been recognized as top contenders for the upcoming Indonesian procurement plan for a wheeled self-propelled howitzer system. While Indonesia has purchased EVA’s competitor Caesar for its army, its Marine Corps has often operated different systems due to different operational requirements for its equipment. The successful export of EVA to neighbouring Malaysia will show the viability of the design and the ability of Slovak companies to strike attractive deals.

This potential is very real given the excellent performance achievable with the full suite of Slovak artillery offerings from the wheeled designs of ZUZANA 2 and EVA to the tracked DIANA. All three of these systems are in the NATO standard calibre of 155mm, with long 52 calibre guns for better range, and all possess multiple round simultaneous impact (MRSI) capability whereby they can fire several shells in staggered succession, so they impact as a single volley. In terms of distinguishing capability, EVA is the fastest on road of the family (at 90km/h on road and 30km/h off road). It offers good range at 41km (with the possibility to extend this further with specific ammunition types) and the highest operational range of action at 700km (how far it can travel in one trip). Like the rest of the family, it is equipped with an autoloader, helping keep the crew to three persons. This crew is well protected and cared for in an enclosed cabin complete with NBC protection and air conditioning (an often-overlooked asset that can be of real value in certain climates, most of which EVA can handle with a -30° to 50° operational temperature range). These attributes are well complemented by a quick set-up time and an excellent fire control system (FCS).

The above attributes are just a quick look at EVA’s capabilities. ZUZANA 2 and DIANA have their own unique characteristics that might make them more appealing under certain circumstances to specific customers. This is vital given that the market for Slovak artillery will not end in Malaysia or Indonesia. Sticking just to the Southeast Asian markets there are other potential customers and for practical and policy reasons both Russia and China will likely struggle in these markets in the coming years. While Western companies have fared better, there remains a great opportunity for Slovakia. For example, several years ago Vietnam was reportedly interested in the French Caesar. However, this to no purchases despite some reports to the contrary.
Perhaps the French loss could be a Slovak gain? Certainly, it looks like Southeast Asia could be the region that may secure the export future of Slovak artillery.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

Minulý rok sme v ICE identifikovali protivzdušnú obranu ako jeden z dôležitých prvkov obrany štátu, ktorý je tak trochu na periférii záujmu. Pripravovali sme projekt, ktorý mal povzbudiť záujem o túto problematiku a dostať protivzdušnú a protiraketovú obranu viac do pozornosti obranných plánovačov. Predpokladali sme, že to ani nebude 
Myslelil sme, že bude treba povzbudiť záujem o túto oblasť a že to nebude ani tak urgentná úloha pre túto vládu, ale azda až pre tie ďalšie.

Protivzdušná a protiraketová obrana sa však, po ruskej invázii na Ukrajinu, stala urgentnou témou. Slovensko sa cez noc stalo štátom, za hranicami ktorého zúri vojna. Riziko úmyselného, alebo aj neúmyselného prevalenia konfliktu poza hranice je väčšie ako si myslíme. Protivzdušná / protiraketová obrana sa tak stáva kľúčovým obranným prvkom štátov na okraji obranného zoskupenia NATO.  

Slovensko potrebuje účinnú ochranu voči prienikom zo vzduchu, čo býva jedným z prvých etáp nepriateľských aktivít. Stále väčšiu naliehavosť v tejto súvislsoti získava aj protidronová ochrana. Ako zabezpečiť efektívnu protivzdušnú obranu Slovenskej republiky v súčasnej situácii, aké sú trendy aj aké sú rozpočtové obmedzenia?

Institut for Central Europe(ICE) zorganizoval expertný okrúhly stôl za účasti zodpovedných predstaviteľov ministerstva obrany, generálneho štábu, vzdušných síl, ale aj expertov z ministerstva financií, zástupcov odbornej verejnosti, ako aj výrobcov príslušnej techniky.

Podujatie svojim príhovorom otvoril štátny tajomník ministerstva obrany p. Marian Majer.

Výsledkom projektu, ktorý podporilo aj Ministerstvo obrany SR bude, okrem poukázania na urgentnosť riešenia problematiky, aj sumarizujúci dokument, ktorý poukáže na možnosti aj trendy v oblasti efektívneho zabezpečenia protivzdušnej obrany. Táto totiž predstavuje významnú nákladovú položku pre verejné financie. Verejná, odborná diskusia musí byť preto nevyhnutnou súčasťou procesov obranného plánovania.

FOTO TASR - Jaroslav Novák

FOTO TASR - Jaroslav Novák

https://www.teraz.sk/slovensko/experti-hodnotili-moznosti-posilnenia-p/643054-clanok.html

Ruská vojna na Ukrajine znamená aj rozhodnutia mnohých štátov investovať viac do svojej obrany. Znamená to teda možnosť na revitalizáciu zbrojného priemyslu aj na Slovensku. Ako dokáže Slovensko zvládnuť črtajúce sa príležitosti? A aké sú príležitosti sú pre húfnicu Zuzana 2, ktorá je jedným z mála ucelených zbrojných produktov, ktoré slovenské firmy vedia vyrobiť? Ukrajina o ne má záujem, ale možnosti sú oveľa väčšie…
Viac v analýze od Freda.

Success in the European markets will be a fight for the ZUZANA 2 mobile artillery system requiring the full backing of the Slovak government, lobbying, and luck. However, ZUZANA 2 may find easer adoption globally as defense markets change in response to the War in Ukraine. CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions look set to be applied more aggressively by the USA than ever before as a response to the Russian invasion. CAATSA provides a significant deterrence to purchasing Russian equipment by providing a legal avenue for applying economic sanctions against Russian defense customers. At the same time, export restrictions on Russia mean that critical subcomponents can no longer be sourced for sophisticated Russian defense products like aircraft, armoured vehicles, air defense systems, artillery, and precision munitions. This means Russia will struggle to meet existing export agreements and may be unable to secure future sales agreements. Taken together these two circumstances will significantly hamper Russian defense exports for the foreseeable future. ZUZANA 2 and other Slovak defense products must be promoted to fill this emerging market gap.

To illustrate the viability of this idea it is necessary to appreciate why some countries choose to purchase Russian defense equipment. Generally, there are four reasons states purchase Russian equipment: as a way of maintaining an independent foreign policy, due to historically good relations with Russia and so owning large inventories of Soviet/Russian equipment, because they face an existential threat from Russia and therefore purchase defense goods as a subservient gesture, or because they are pariah states and so Russian weaponry is their only available option. Often these reasons can intersect. Russian defense customers are therefore distributed globally with significant purchases made in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucuses, Africa, and to a lesser extent, South America. So how could Slovakia and its defense products supplant Russian defense sales in some of these regions? Obviously, understanding the motivation of specific customers is key. Slovakia should focus on those Russian customers looking to follow an independent foreign policy and/or those who have large inventories of Russian/Soviet equipment. Suitable target customers include but are not limited to: India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Egypt, and Algeria. Many of these states choose Russian defense equipment because for them it comes with less problematic geopolitical implications compared to American or Chinese alternatives (such as Vietnam) or because purchasing from just one region would risk them being beholden to governments who may use defense sales as diplomatic/political leverage (this is the motivation for Saudi Arabia and Egypt and is typically aimed at avoiding being totally beholden to the USA). Even those states who remain willing to purchase Russian equipment (such as India) will be unable to do so as Russian production grinds to a halt. With these needs no longer capable of being met by Russia there is now space for European defense companies to step in, and especially companies based in countries like Slovakia that are motivated more by economic rather than geopolitical concerns. Slovakia does not use its defense products as a tool for coercing sovereign states as opposed to companies based in places like France and UK that might be used as diplomatic tools, therefore Slovakia is the ideal defense supplier for states wishing to maintain an independent foreign policy. Slovak companies such as Konštrukta Defence and many others are perfectly positioned to exploit this opportunity having extensive experience in maintaining and updating Soviet style weaponry, as well as producing new defense products that would be suitable replacements for Russian equipment. It is in these circumstances that ZUZANA 2 is most likely to see major success.

Obviously Slovak defense companies will face significant competition, but the world market is large enough and Slovak defense products competitive enough that this is not an immediate concern. In the case of ZUZANA 2 likely competition will come from Israel’s ATMOS 2000, Serbia’s Nora B-52, France’s Caesar, Sweden’s Archer and other nascent systems yet to be fielded. ZUZANA 2 can compete with all of these, and where it struggles other Slovak products might be put forward such as the yet to be purchased EVA artillery system.

For anyone who doubts the viability of this export strategy they should understand it has historical precedent, especially for Slovakia. The inter war years (1919-1938) saw Czechoslovakia become one of the world’s premier arms producers by following a similar strategy, producing high quality armaments for independent countries who wanted to limit their exposure to the great games of great powers. Slovakia is well positioned to follow a similar path. It has a variety of native defense products and shared defense projects that could very easily be export successes. ZUZANA 2 is emblematic of these but there are several others. By pursuing global markets for its products Slovakia can follow a path that made is predecessor state one of hubs of the global defense industry.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

Slovenská húfnica Zuzana je jedným z mála ucelených výrobkov slovenského zbrojárskeho priemyslu. Nedávno sa opäť dostala do medzinárodnej pozornosti kvôli možnosti jej predaja Ukrajine.
Fred vo svojom článku analyzuje príležitosti slovenskej húfnice aj v kontexte s modernizačnými projektami u našich susedov…

Recent defense news from Hungary suggests it is close to securing a deal with Rheinmetall for the procurement of its new HX3 mobile howitzer. Between this and the Czech adoption of the French Caesar there is significant frustration in Slovakia concerning the lack of European export success of the ZUZANA 2 mobile artillery system. ZUZANA 2 is a very capable and competitive system whose lack of export success defies its technical qualities. However, there are new opportunities emerging for the ZUZANA 2 and other Slovak defense products as a wave of political will for rearmament sweeps Europe.

ZUZANA 2 ostensibly lost to Caesar in Czech trials due to lower cost estimates (that have now increased) and supposedly the greater variety of 155mm ammunition types that Caesar is rated to fire. Caesar adoption by Czechia is questionable and sacrificed a century of Czechoslovak independence in artillery production. It is highly likely that the ZUZANA 2 can fire all 155mm shell types, could have been acquired for less cost per unit than the Caesar, is better protected, has greater accessory options, better features, and would have promoted regional defense integration. Even Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová hints that ZUZANA 2 might have been a better choice¹. In contrast the Hungarian political decision to select the HX3 155mm is more understandable, although the apparent decision to adopt without a competition is not ideal from the perspective of ensuring free and fair procurement processes in Europe and could, if established as a trend, risk the Hungarian military being equipped with sub-optimal equipment.

However, given Hungary’s excellent relationship with Rheinmetall and the specifications of the HX3 155mm itself it is perhaps not surprising Hungary might consider a competition unnecessary. The HX3 155mm so far looks similar to ZUZANA 2 with its prototypes possessing many of the features that Caesar lacks. Where the HX3 stands out is in its future development. Reportedly, the Hungarian acquisition of the HX3 will aim at incorporating Rheinmetall’s new L60 gun, which being longer and with a larger breech can fire rounds further more economically. ZUZANA 2 and other 55 calibre artillery systems (including the HX3 with its standard gun) still have significant reach with Vulcano 155mm rounds pushing an 80km range, but the L60 can do this at a lower cost with less sophisticated ammunition types and should be able to reach further than 80km with Vulcano rounds. Where ZUZANA 2 may have an edge over the HX3 could be cost, although this is speculation due to the limited cost data available.

Exporting ZUZANA 2 is both a matter of practicality and national pride in Slovakia. Slovakia knows it has a winning system but has struggled to find its place in the European market. This is changing. Wheeled artillery is increasingly popular and is often fielded as a complement to tracked artillery vehicles. The main advantages wheeled systems have over tracked are reduced maintenance costs, maintenance needs, and faster speeds (on road). Possible opportunities for ZUZANA 2 in the European market exist in Poland, Croatia, Finland, and the Baltic states (there are many outside of Europe but this is discussed in an upcoming article). Finland in particular is an interesting case that could provide a model for advancing ZUZANA 2 sales. It has new tracked howitzers entering service being supported by older systems (the ubiquitous Gvozdika) in need of replacement. Here, Slovakia could use its own likely procurement of Finland’s Patria AMV to incentivize the Finnish government to consider procuring ZUZANA 2.

In a similar way it seems like both Hungary and Slovakia missed an opportunity to secure procurement deals for one another’s vehicles. Hungary is the partner of Rheinmetall in the current Slovak tracked IFV tender (offering the Lynx IFV). Given Slovakia’s use of government-to-government deals in its procurement projects it is possible that a deal could have been worked out where Slovakia agreed to adopt the Lynx while Hungary adopts the ZUZANA 2.  Regardless of whether this would be realistic it shows that Slovakia could use its own procurement projects to further the export potential of ZUZANA 2 by promoting deals that mutually benefit the domestic industries of all parties involved.

For ZUZANA 2 to become the export success it was expected to be there needs to be a serious government backed effort to market this system in novel ways that play to Slovakia’s strengths and make use of Slovakia’s own rearmament efforts. Understanding the variety of European market options available and promoting ZUZANA 2 in a way that takes advantage of the specific circumstances of each bid is the first step.

¹Vojáček, J. (2021, November 20). Future Minister of Defense: We should get rid of Soviet technology. iDnes.cz. https://www.idnes.cz/technet/vojenstvi/jana-cernochova-vize-armada-vyzbroj-tendr-akvizice-ministryne-obrany.A211118_163107_vojenstvi_alv

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

Fred krátko napísal o favoritoch v historicky najväčšom tendri na slovenskej obrane, ktorý môže dosiahnuť až 2 mld eur.

Slovakia needs a new tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to supplement, and eventually replace, the BVP and the more capable BVP 2 vehicles currently in service. IFVs are armoured personnel carriers that are designed to both bring troops to the battlefield and to fight in support of them. The Cold War origins of the BVP mean that while it remains a capable platform, its survivability and lethality on the modern battlefield are slowly decreasing. By replacing the BVP and BVP 2, Slovakia will also have an opportunity to increase its military compatibility with NATO. Slovakia will be looking for a well protected, mobile, and well armed IFV that is sufficiently advanced to justify the expenditure. It is also a likely demand, and always a welcome feature, that a future IFV has some of its parts produced domestically.

The Slovak Ministry of Defence (MoD) is expecting eight proposals from different companies to meet this tender. However, with the political decision to keep Korean and Turkish companies out of the competition, we expect that there are only four IFVs that are likely to meet Slovak expectations: Rheinmetall’s Lynx, General Dynamics’ ASCOD, BAE’s CV90, and Projekt System & Management GmbH’s (PSM) Puma.

These vehicles are all highly capable platforms. They are all built around modularity to allow for increased flexibility in the types of missions they can perform. There are pros and cons to each choice, and through a brief analysis we can see that of the four options there are two that stand out as candidates for a Slovak tracked IFV.

1) The Puma is an excellent IFV designed for the German Bundeswehr. It is the best choice for the German military, but perhaps not for Slovakia. The Puma has been designed with input from many German companies. This makes adapting the Puma to Slovak needs more difficult as there are many vendors that need consulting. This lack of design flexibility is reportedly the reason that the Puma dropped out of the Czech IFV competition. When the Czechs changed the parameters of the competition, PSM decided that it was not worthwhile to redesign their vehicle to continue. This, in combination with a probable high initial and lifetime (for example in spare parts) costs, makes the Puma an unlikely choice for a future Slovak IFV.

2) General Dynamics’ ASCOD is an advanced and highly adaptable IFV design that has been adopted in different forms by several militaries. This adaptability may be the biggest attraction for Slovakia. With the need to steadily replace non-NATO standard equipment, the ASCOD could provide a common chassis for projects beyond an IFV. For example, a SAM version of the ASCOD could be used to replace the obsolescent “Kub” systems currently in service. The commonality of parts between IFV and SHORAD systems would provide a simplified logistics chain. However, there have been recent quality control issues with the UK version of ASCOD (UK designation AJAX), which may have damaged the reputation of the ASCOD. Yet, the ASCOD has proven to be a success in its Ulan form in neighbouring Austria. This suggests that the ASCOD could be a suitable choice of IFV for Slovakia.

This leaves the two standout options for Slovakia, the CV90 and Lynx.

3) The CV90 is an excellent and proven design. It has been heavily customized for a variety of customer demands and can easily be configured for Slovak needs. As should be expected of a vehicle with Swedish origin, it has outstanding mobility in winter conditions. A Slovak partner for the CV90 should be easy to find. The unique selling point of the CV-90, when compared to the other vehicles on this list, is its exemplary combat and service history. It has active combat in Afghanistan with Norway and Denmark, proving itself to be a highly effective IFV. Its service with seven different countries means that lifetime cost data are readily available, which unlike for the Lynx means that total project costs are easier to predict.

4) The Lynx is a very well protected modern IFV made by Rheinmetall. Much like the ASCOD it can be configured in many different ways. Some technology that went into the design of the Puma has been incorporated into the Lynx. However, unlike the consortium behind the sale of the Puma, Rheinmetall has shown impressive flexibility in working with potential operators. Rheinmetall has advertised the Lynx as a cost-effective platform that can be easily updated to meet the demands of the modern battlefield. This can be seen in its ability to use the AMAP-ADS active protection system. However, the cost effectiveness of the Lynx is hard to determine due its limited service thus far. The recent selection of the Lynx by Hungary included some elements of domestic production (former state owned company in Moldava), which could be an incentive for its purchase by Slovakia if a similar deal could be reached. However, it is worth considering that the selection of a new IFV is also a political process as much as it is a practical one. This is born out by the exclusion of Israel, Turkey, and Korea from the IFV tender. The tensions between the Hungarian government and the European Union may make the Slovak government reticent about following the Hungarian lead in selecting the Lynx.

For now, determining the likely Slovak IFV remains speculative. Any of the mentioned vehicles could be viable options for Slovakia and would represent a significant improvement over the BVP platforms currently in use. The choice of IFV will likely be determined by issues beyond simple capability, with domestic partnerships and chassis use in other projects being key considerations.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

In response to a request for submissions for a new armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) from the Slovak government five designs have been submitted. Spain has submitted their Dragon AFV, Romanian has submitted a version of the Piranha V, the USA is offering their Stryker platform, Czechia is offering their configuration of the Pandur II, and Finland is offering the Patria AMV.

Interestingly the Dragon, Piranha, and Stryker are all derivatives of the same design, the MOWAG Piranha.
Arguably there are therefore only three truly unique designs in this competition so far. Indeed, given that the same company (General Dynamics Land Systems) is behind both the Pandur, and Piranha designs it is questionable if there is a significant difference in the design between the two vehicles. The Slovak AFV competition therefore appears to be the offerings of GDLS against the single entry of Patria. There is no inherent issue with three designs from the same company being submitted to this type of competition although it is questionable whether this strategy is worth the effort.

The Stryker AFV has seen very little export success, receiving only a minor Thai contract outside of the USA. The design itself is no longer cutting edge and it would be very surprising if this was the competition winner.
The Piranha V is undoubtedly the strongest GDLS contender being the most armoured and adaptable of their offerings. It is likely that the Pandur is being offered due to its current use by Czechia and Austria proving the regional suitability of the design (a feature shared by the Patria AMV which is operated in Poland).

The Pandur is a less competitive offering the Piranha V or Patria AMV in terms of features but might be offered at a lower price and with the selling point of regional cooperation between the Czech and Slovak militaries and industries.

It is therefore likely that this competition will be between the Piranha V (either the Romanian or Spanish versions) and the Patria AMV.

These are both strong and proven designs which should suit the needs of the Slovak military. It remains to be seen how Slovak military industry will be incorporated into any deal made and this may prove to be a significant factor in the final decision.

A final interesting feature of this competition is the conspicuous absences of the German Boxer, French VCBI, and Turkish FNSS Pars and/or Otokar Arma from the current offers. Perhaps the lack of amphibious capability for most of these vehicles held them back in this competition.

Frederick Hardman Lea – ICE Analyst

S rozmachom informačných technológií a neustále sa zvyšujúcou dostupnosťou internetu pre široké masy dochádza aj k stále častejšiemu výskytu šírenia nepravdivých informácií. Súhrnne je zvykom ich označovať pojmom dezinformácie, falošné správy či hoaxy, pričom používatelia tieto pojmy často považujú za synonymá a voľne ich medzi sebou zamieňajú. Pravdou je, že všetky tieto pojmy súvisia s nepravdivými informáciami a majú podobný význam, nie sú však v skutočnosti synonymami v pravom zmysle slova.

Predhovor

Diskusia o problematike hybridných hrozieb a dezinformácií priniesla celú škálu pojmov, ktoré sme v slovenskom jazyku doposiaľ nemali, nepoužívali alebo používali v inom význame. Termíny ako dezinformácie, hoax, falošné správy alebo trol, bot či kyborg sa často medzi sebou voľne zamieňajú, používajú ako synonymá a len málokto, azda okrem odborníkov na túto problematiku, ich dokáže rozoznať a správne používať.

Dezinformácie dnes pritom predstavujú jednu z najväčších hrozieb, ktorej ako štát i spoločnosť čelíme a zároveň účinný boj proti dezinformáciám a budovanie odolnosti spoločnosti voči nim sú cieľmi, ktoré sa nám zatiaľ darí napĺňať len veľmi pomaly a čiastočne. Za krok smerom k napĺňaniu týchto cieľov pritom možno považovať i správne rozlišovanie a poznanie pojmov a vzťahov medzi nimi.

Táto publikácia stavia na predošlej práci Národného bezpečnostného analytického centra Slovenskej informačnej služby, Stratpolu, a iných organizácií, ktoré v slovenských podmienkach spracovali terminologické slovníky hybridných hrozieb, popisujúce a definujúce jednotlivé pojmy späté s dezinformačnými kampaňami.
Cieľom predkladanej publikácie je nielen definovanie kľúčových pojmov, ale aj vysvetlenie súvzťažností a rozdielov medzi nimi, zasadzujúc ich do kontextu a ilustrujúc na konkrétnych príkladoch z praxe dezinformačných kampaní.

Publikácia je určená predovšetkým pre pracovníkov štátnych inštitúcií, ktorí prichádzajú do styku s problematikou šírenia dezinformácií, ako aj pre širšiu verejnosť a kohokoľvek, kto si chce ujasniť často neprehľadnú terminológiu hybridných hrozieb. Je spracovaná s podporou Ministerstva obrany Slovenskej republiky, v rámci projektu „Posilnenie odolnosti SR voči hybridným hrozbám zo strany ruských aktérov – dezinformačné kampane na sociálnych sieťach“. Nadväzuje na workshop „Propagandistické nástroje ruských aktérov na sociálnych sieťach – ako ich rozpoznať a ako sa im brániť?“, ktorý Inštitút pre centrálnu Európu realizoval 7. 10. 2021 v Bratislave, ako aj na štúdiu „Ako čeliť riadeným dezinformáciám na sociálnych sieťach? Skúsenosti Ukrajiny, Gruzínska a Moldavska“.

Celý dokument autorov Tomáša Baranca, Kataríny Cséfalvayovej a Frederick Hardman Lea nájdete tu:

Realizované s finančnou podporou Ministerstva obrany Slovenskej republiky v rámci dotačného programu.
Za obsah tohto dokumentu je výlučne zodpovedný Inštitút pre Centrálnu Európu.